Summary application in banking liquidation upheld where special statute gave wide jurisdiction and no procedural rules were prescribed.

A special liquidation statute conferring wide jurisdiction on the court to decide all claims and questions arising in winding up permits claims to be pursued by summary application where no procedural rules have been prescribed. The normal proceeding under section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 was treated as an application and not necessarily a regular suit, and the absence of a suit form did not defeat subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, an ex parte decree passed on such an application was not void or without jurisdiction, and the challenge to it failed.

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Issues: Whether a claim by a banking company liquidator under section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, could be pursued by application in the High Court, and whether an ex parte decree obtained on such an application was without jurisdiction and a nullity.

Analysis: The winding-up provisions in Part III-A of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 were enacted to secure speedy disposal of liquidation proceedings. Section 45-B conferred full power on the Court to decide all claims, questions of property, and all other questions arising in the course of winding up. Section 45-G contemplated rules regulating the mode of proceedings, but in the absence of such rules the procedure was left to the Court's judgment and discretion. On this scheme, the normal proceeding under section 45-B was held to be a summary proceeding by application, not necessarily a regular suit. Since the Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute, the fact that relief was sought by application did not render the decree a nullity.

Conclusion: The ex parte decree was not without jurisdiction or void, and the suit challenging it was rightly dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special liquidation statute confers wide jurisdiction and leaves the mode of proceeding to the Court's discretion in the absence of rules, a claim may be validly pursued by summary application, and an order made in such a proceeding is not void merely because it was not brought by suit.

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