Interim orders without reasons are not binding precedent; statutory appeal must be used before invoking writ jurisdiction.

An interim order that contains no reasons or articulated legal principle does not operate as binding precedent because precedent depends on the ratio actually decided. Where cancellation of a certificate under the U.P. Trade Tax Act was appealable under the statute, and there was no case of lack of jurisdiction or breach of natural justice, the proper course was to pursue the statutory appeal rather than invoke writ jurisdiction. The appellate remedy was to be pursued expeditiously in accordance with law, and the writ challenge was not entertained on merits.

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Issues: (i) Whether an interim order passed in another writ petition, which contains no reason or ratio, could be treated as a binding precedent. (ii) Whether the writ petition challenging cancellation of the certificate under section 4-B of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 should be entertained when an appeal lay under section 9 of the Act.

Issue (i): Whether an interim order passed in another writ petition, which contains no reason or ratio, could be treated as a binding precedent.

Analysis: A judicial decision binds only for the ratio actually decided. An interim order that merely grants interim protection without stating reasons or laying down a principle of law does not constitute binding precedent. Such an order cannot be relied upon as authority for a legal proposition in a subsequent case.

Conclusion: The interim order in the other writ petition was not binding precedent.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition challenging cancellation of the certificate under section 4-B of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 should be entertained when an appeal lay under section 9 of the Act.

Analysis: The impugned order was appealable under the statute, and there was no finding that it was without jurisdiction or passed in violation of natural justice. Since the petitioner had an efficacious statutory remedy, the proper course was to pursue the appeal before the appellate authority rather than invoke extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Direction was therefore issued to prefer the appeal, and the appellate authority was required to decide it expeditiously in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained on merits and the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appeal remedy.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the cancellation order was disposed of by directing recourse to the statutory appellate remedy, while holding that the earlier interim order could not be treated as a precedent.

Ratio Decidendi: An interim order unaccompanied by reasons or a declared legal principle is not binding precedent, and where an efficacious statutory appeal is available, writ jurisdiction should ordinarily not be invoked.

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