Contractual arbitrator appointment survives beyond 30 days until court intervention, and apprehended bias alone does not displace agreed procedure.

In a Section 11(6) arbitration context, expiry of 30 days from the demand did not by itself extinguish the respondent's contractual right to appoint an arbitrator because no statutory 30-day limit applies to Section 11(6), and the right subsists until the other party moves the court. An appointment made before filing the Section 11 application was therefore treated as valid. The Court also declined to replace the agreed mechanism with an independent arbitrator merely on apprehended bias, since the arbitration clause authorised nomination of the respondent's officer. Any challenge to independence, impartiality, bias, or misconduct was left to the arbitral process and, if necessary, Section 34 proceedings.

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Issues: (i) Whether, in a proceeding under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the respondent lost the contractual right to appoint an arbitrator because the appointment was made after 30 days from the demand but before filing of the application. (ii) Whether the Court should appoint an independent arbitrator outside the contractual mechanism on the ground of apprehended bias where the agreement specifically authorises appointment of an officer of the respondent.

Issue (i): Whether, in a proceeding under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the respondent lost the contractual right to appoint an arbitrator because the appointment was made after 30 days from the demand but before filing of the application.

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguishes between Section 11(4) and Section 11(5), where a 30-day period is expressly provided, and Section 11(6), where no such period is prescribed. Where the parties have already agreed upon an appointment procedure, the failure of the appointing party to act within 30 days does not, by itself, extinguish the right to appoint. The right continues until the opposite party moves the Court under Section 11 seeking appointment. Since the respondent appointed the arbitrator before the application under Section 11(6) was filed, the appointment could not be treated as invalid on the ground of delay alone.

Conclusion: The respondent did not forfeit the contractual right to appoint the arbitrator merely because the appointment was made after 30 days, and the appointment made before the filing of the Section 11 application was valid.

Issue (ii): Whether the Court should appoint an independent arbitrator outside the contractual mechanism on the ground of apprehended bias where the agreement specifically authorises appointment of an officer of the respondent.

Analysis: The arbitration clause expressly permitted the respondent to nominate its own officer as arbitrator, and the party had entered into the contract with that stipulation. A mere apprehension that such an appointee may not be impartial is not enough to override the agreed mechanism. The proper course is to raise any challenge to independence, impartiality, bias, or misconduct in the arbitral proceedings and, if necessary, in proceedings for setting aside the award under Section 34.

Conclusion: The Court declined to substitute the contractual appointment mechanism with an outside arbitrator on the ground of bias alone.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the respondent's appointment of the arbitrator was upheld and the Court found no justification to interfere with the contractual arbitral process.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, no automatic forfeiture of the right to appoint an arbitrator occurs merely on expiry of 30 days from demand; the right continues until the opposite party approaches the Court, and the agreed contractual appointment procedure should ordinarily be respected absent exceptional grounds.

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