Alternative remedy, mala fides and proportionality in disciplinary law: dismissal for proved abusive misconduct was upheld.

Availability of an alternative statutory remedy did not by itself bar writ jurisdiction, because judicial review remains open where there is lack of jurisdiction, breach of natural justice, violation of fundamental rights, or challenge to vires; the writ petition was therefore maintainable. The disciplinary action was not shown to be mala fide, as partial exoneration and proved misconduct negatived bias, and the suspension was treated as pending enquiry under the employer's rules rather than a penalty under the Factories Rules. Dismissal for proved abusive and threatening conduct toward a superior was not shockingly disproportionate, so interference with the punishment was unwarranted.

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Issues: (i) whether the existence of an alternative statutory remedy barred the writ petition; (ii) whether the disciplinary action was vitiated by mala fides or lack of jurisdiction in applying the governing service rules; and (iii) whether the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the proved misconduct.

Issue (i): whether the existence of an alternative statutory remedy barred the writ petition

Analysis: The availability of an appeal under the Rules did not by itself bar exercise of writ jurisdiction. Judicial review may still be invoked where there is want of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice, infringement of fundamental rights, or challenge to vires. Once the writ court has entertained and decided the matter on merits, interference in appeal solely on the ground of alternate remedy is ordinarily unwarranted.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable and the High Court did not err in entertaining it.

Issue (ii): whether the disciplinary action was vitiated by mala fides or lack of jurisdiction in applying the governing service rules

Analysis: The charge of mala fides was rejected because the enquiry resulted in exoneration on two charges and proved misconduct on one charge, which negatived any inference of bias or malicious initiation. The suspension was not a penalty imposed under the Factories Rules but a suspension pending enquiry under the employer's disciplinary rules, and the employee had accepted subsistence allowance without demur. The finding that the suspension had to be judged under the penalty provision of the Factories Rules was therefore incorrect.

Conclusion: The disciplinary action was not shown to be mala fide, and the suspension was not governed by the penalty provision relied upon by the appellant.

Issue (iii): whether the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the proved misconduct

Analysis: The misconduct of abusive and threatening behaviour towards a superior officer stood proved and was also admitted in substance. Admitted facts need not be proved, and in disciplinary matters the court will interfere with punishment only when the penalty is shockingly disproportionate or mitigating circumstances justify reduction. In the absence of any extenuating circumstance, dismissal for grave verbal abuse was held to be within permissible disciplinary limits.

Conclusion: The punishment of dismissal was not disproportionate.

Final Conclusion: No ground was made out to interfere with the High Court's decision, and the challenge to the order of dismissal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Existence of an alternative remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where exceptions such as lack of jurisdiction or breach of natural justice apply, and dismissal for proved grave misconduct, including abusive behaviour towards a superior, will not be interfered with absent extenuating circumstances or shocking disproportionality.

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