Writ jurisdiction barred after failure of statutory remedies; natural justice and jurisdictional objections did not justify interference.

Where a taxing statute provides a complete appellate, second appeal and revisional framework, writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 is ordinarily unavailable after the assessee has unsuccessfully pursued those remedies, including on limitation; the assessment attains finality and the doctrine of merger applies. The court also distinguished inherent lack of jurisdiction from a mere erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, holding that an alleged improper transfer or choice of assessing officer must generally be corrected within the statutory scheme. On the facts noted, no specific denial of reasonable opportunity or natural justice was established, so writ relief was refused and the assessment and penalty orders were left undisturbed.

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Issues: (i) whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was maintainable to challenge an assessment order after the assessee had unsuccessfully pursued the statutory appeal, further appeal, and revision remedies under the taxing statute; (ii) whether the assessment order was liable to be quashed for alleged violation of natural justice, want of jurisdiction in the assessing authority, and improper transfer of the assessment.

Issue (i): Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was maintainable to challenge an assessment order after the assessee had unsuccessfully pursued the statutory appeal, further appeal, and revision remedies under the taxing statute.

Analysis: The statutory scheme provided a complete hierarchy of remedies against the assessment order, including appeal, condonation of delay, second appeal, and revision. The assessee had availed those remedies but failed, including on the ground of limitation. The rule requiring exhaustion of alternate remedies is one of prudence and discretion, and a litigant who has disabled himself from obtaining relief within the statutory framework cannot ordinarily be permitted to invoke writ jurisdiction against the original assessment. The original order was treated as having attained finality under the Act, and the doctrine of merger was applied to reject the attempt to re-open the assessment through writ proceedings after failure in statutory remedies.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable, and the challenge to the assessment order under Articles 226 and 227 was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order was liable to be quashed for alleged violation of natural justice, want of jurisdiction in the assessing authority, and improper transfer of the assessment.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee was given opportunity to file objections and seek time, and the seized documents could be relied upon where the assessee had access to explain the transactions. No specific denial of reasonable opportunity was established. As to jurisdiction, the Commissioner had authority to transfer the matter, and even if the transfer order or the choice of officer was erroneous, such error would amount to an error in exercise of jurisdiction and not an inherent lack of jurisdiction. The decision distinguishes between orders passed without jurisdiction and orders passed with jurisdiction but allegedly erroneously, holding that the latter are to be corrected in the statutory appellate or revisional process rather than by writ intervention.

Conclusion: The grounds of natural justice and lack of jurisdiction were not accepted, and no writ relief was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed on both maintainability and merits, and the assessment and penalty orders were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxing statute provides an efficacious appellate and revisional mechanism, a party that has unsuccessfully pursued those remedies, including on limitation, cannot ordinarily invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge the original assessment on grounds that were or could have been agitated within that statutory framework; only inherent lack of jurisdiction, not mere erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, justifies such interference.

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