Inclusive statutory definition permits refund jurisdiction by Assistant Commercial Taxes Officers; administrative circular cannot narrow the Rules.

The inclusive definition of "Commercial Taxes Officer" in rule 2(d) was read to include an Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, and the corresponding scheme of the Rules showed that territorial and functional jurisdiction was to be fixed by the Commissioner. On that construction, refund under rule 38-D read with section 23BB could not be confined only to a Commercial Taxes Officer where an Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer otherwise had jurisdiction. The departmental circular restricting refund power to Commercial Taxes Officers alone was held inconsistent with the Act and Rules and therefore invalid. The refund authority was not narrowed by the circular, and the broader statutory jurisdiction prevailed.

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Issues: Whether refund under rule 38-D of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules, 1955 read with section 23BB of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 could be granted by an Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, and whether the circular restricting refund powers to Commercial Taxes Officers alone was valid.

Analysis: The definition of "Commercial Taxes Officer" in rule 2(d) was held to be inclusive of an Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer. The same inclusive expression was used in relation to the "assessing authority" under section 2(b), and the scheme of rules 3 and 4 showed that territorial and functional jurisdiction was to be fixed by the Commissioner. On that construction, the words used in rule 38-D could not be read narrowly so as to exclude an Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer where he otherwise had jurisdiction. The objection that refund to an unregistered dealer could be granted only by a Commercial Taxes Officer was rejected, and the departmental circular limiting refund power to Commercial Taxes Officers alone was found inconsistent with the Act and the Rules.

Conclusion: Refund under rule 38-D could validly be granted by an Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer having jurisdiction, and the circular excluding such authority was invalid.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed and the orders allowing the writ petitions and quashing the circular and notice were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory definition of an authority is inclusive, the term must be read in that enlarged sense unless the context clearly requires exclusion, and an administrative circular cannot curtail the jurisdiction conferred by the Act and the Rules.

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