State advised cane price was only recommendatory; statutory price fixation power was not implied under the sugarcane law.

The State advised cane price had no statutory force because the term "advised" made it recommendatory, not a binding price fixation enforceable by coercive steps. Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 was held not to confer an implied power on the State Government to fix sugarcane price, as the power was not expressly provided and the legislative context showed it was left out. The repugnancy question with the Central law was left open. The State could still facilitate voluntary negotiations on price, but any resulting agreement would bind only by consent, not compulsion.

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Issues: (i) Whether the State advised cane price had statutory force and could be compulsorily enforced; (ii) Whether Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 empowered the State Government to fix sugarcane price; (iii) Whether the constitutional question of repugnancy with the Central law arose; and (iv) whether the State machinery could play a role in evolving a voluntary agreement on price.

Issue (i): Whether the State advised cane price had statutory force and could be compulsorily enforced.

Analysis: The expression "advised" indicated that the price was recommendatory and not a statutory fixation. The State orders and affidavits showed that the price was announced in the hope that factories would agree to pay it, rather than as an order backed by statutory compulsion. A price without statutory basis cannot be enforced against a factory owner by coercive steps not sanctioned by law.

Conclusion: The State advised cane price had no statutory flavour and could not be compulsorily enforced as a binding statutory price.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 empowered the State Government to fix sugarcane price.

Analysis: Section 16 empowered regulation of purchase and supply, but the power to fix price was not expressly provided. The legislative history, the omission of earlier price-fixation provisions, and the reasoning in the Constitution Bench decision in Tika Ramji indicated that price fixation was consciously left out. The general word "regulate" could not be stretched, in this context, to include price fixation.

Conclusion: Section 16 did not confer power on the State Government to fix sugarcane price.

Issue (iii): Whether the constitutional question of repugnancy with the Central law arose.

Analysis: Since the State Act did not confer power to fix price, there was no need to decide whether a State price-fixation law would conflict with the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966 and Article 254 of the Constitution of India. The constitutional issue was left open.

Conclusion: The repugnancy question was not decided and remained open.

Issue (iv): Whether the State machinery could play a role in evolving a voluntary agreement on price.

Analysis: Although the State advised price had no legal compulsion, the State could still recommend or facilitate negotiations so that the parties might voluntarily agree on a price. Such an agreement, once voluntarily entered into, would be binding according to its terms, but the State could not compel its execution in the absence of statutory authority.

Conclusion: The State could lawfully facilitate a voluntary agreement on price, but could not coerce adoption of the advised price.

Final Conclusion: The decision invalidated compulsory enforcement of the State advised cane price and rejected the claimed statutory power to fix price under Section 16, while leaving the repugnancy issue open and preserving voluntary agreements reached through State-facilitated negotiations.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory power to regulate supply and purchase does not, without clear legislative language and context, include an implied power to fix price; a recommendatory State price can operate only through voluntary agreement and not by coercive enforcement.

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