Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: Whether the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has incidental or ancillary power, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, to stay further proceedings pursuant to a remand order when the statute does not expressly confer such power.
Analysis: The statutory scheme of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 did not contain an express provision authorising the Tribunal to stay the giving effect to a remand order. The reasoning followed the settled principle that when a statute confers appellate jurisdiction, it impliedly carries the power to do all acts and employ all means essential to its effective exercise. That implied power is available to prevent the appeal from being rendered nugatory. Since the relief sought was only a stay of further proceedings pursuant to the remand order, the Tribunal could have considered the request as one within its ancillary jurisdiction. The absence of an express stay provision did not, by itself, exclude the Tribunal's implied power.
Conclusion: The Tribunal had the incidental or ancillary power to grant stay of further proceedings arising from the remand order, and its contrary view was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the writ petitions were disposed of with consequential directions, while allowing the assessing authority to proceed with the assessments until final orders were passed.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority, even in the absence of an express provision, has implied incidental or ancillary power to grant stay orders necessary to make its appellate jurisdiction effective, unless the statute expressly excludes that power.