Condonation of delay depends on the law in force when revision is filed, with statutory limits governing maintainability

Condonation of delay in revision proceedings is a procedural matter governed by the law in force when the revision is filed, not by the law existing when the original proceedings commenced. The court applied the principle that no vested right exists to seek condonation under an earlier limitation regime, and held the contrary view to be no longer good law. It also assessed the connected revision petitions category-wise under the amended limitation provision: delays beyond the statutory limit were not entertainable, while delays within the permissible period were condoned where satisfactorily explained, including correction of two petitions found to involve only an eight-day delay.

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Issues: (i) Whether the power to condone delay in filing revision petitions is governed by the law in force on the date of commencement of the original proceedings or by the law in force on the date of filing the revision petitions; (ii) whether the delay in the connected revision petitions could be condoned under the amended limitation provision.

Issue (i): Whether the power to condone delay in filing revision petitions is governed by the law in force on the date of commencement of the original proceedings or by the law in force on the date of filing the revision petitions.

Analysis: The governing principle applied was that condonation of delay is a matter of procedure and does not create a vested right in the litigant. A party may have a right to initiate proceedings, but the privilege of seeking condonation of delay depends on the law in force when the need to invoke that privilege arises. The Court preferred the law declared by the Supreme Court, which held that the question of condonation of delay must be governed by the law in force at the time the revision or claim is filed. On that basis, the earlier contrary view was held no longer good law.

Conclusion: The law applicable to condonation of delay is the law in force on the date of filing of the revision petition, not the law on the date when the original proceedings commenced.

Issue (ii): Whether the delay in the connected revision petitions could be condoned under the amended limitation provision.

Analysis: The petitions were examined category-wise on the basis of the length of delay and the statutory limit for condonation under the amended provision. Petitions involving delay beyond the period permitted by the statute were held incapable of being entertained, while petitions involving delay within the statutory limit and supported by an acceptable explanation were allowed. The Court also corrected an earlier common order in respect of two petitions where the delay was found to be only eight days.

Conclusion: Revision petitions with delay beyond the statutory limit were rejected, while petitions within the permissible period were allowed and the delay was condoned.

Final Conclusion: The decision affirms that condonation of delay is governed by the procedural law in force when delay arises, and the connected matters were disposed of partly by rejection and partly by condonation of delay according to the period of delay in each case.

Ratio Decidendi: Condonation of delay is a procedural privilege, not a vested right, and therefore it is controlled by the law in force on the date when the delay is sought to be excused.

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