Preventive detention cannot rest on vague bail assumptions or replace ordinary criminal law where that law is adequate.

Preventive detention was held unsustainable where the supposed likelihood of bail rested only on a bare, unexplained assertion that bail had been granted in similar cases, without any supporting particulars; such ipse dixit was not reliable material for the required satisfaction, and the detention order failed on that ground. The detention was also unjustified because preventive detention is an exceptional measure confined by Article 21, and where the alleged conduct could be addressed under the ordinary criminal and drugs-control laws, recourse to preventive detention was unnecessary. The common detention orders were quashed and the detenus were directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

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Issues: (i) Whether the detention order was vitiated because the alleged likelihood of the detenu being released on bail was based only on an unsupported and vague assertion that bail had been granted in similar cases. (ii) Whether preventive detention could be sustained when the ordinary criminal law was sufficient to deal with the alleged conduct.

Issue (i): Whether the detention order was vitiated because the alleged likelihood of the detenu being released on bail was based only on an unsupported and vague assertion that bail had been granted in similar cases.

Analysis: The detention order rested on the assumption that the detenu might obtain bail, although no bail application was then shown to be pending and no particulars were supplied about the supposed similar cases. No dates, bail application numbers, identity of co-accused, or factual parity of those cases were disclosed. A bald assertion of this kind was treated as a mere ipse dixit and not as reliable material for forming the necessary satisfaction.

Conclusion: The detention order was invalid on this ground and could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether preventive detention could be sustained when the ordinary criminal law was sufficient to deal with the alleged conduct.

Analysis: Preventive detention was treated as an exceptional power that must be confined within narrow limits because personal liberty under Article 21 is the central constitutional rule and Article 22(3)(b) operates only as an exception. Where the alleged conduct could be dealt with under the ordinary penal law, resort to preventive detention was considered unjustified. On the facts, the accusation related to sale of expired drugs after tampering with labels, which could be addressed by the criminal law and the Drugs and Cosmetics law, so the preventive measure was unnecessary.

Conclusion: Preventive detention was not justified where the ordinary law was sufficient, and the detention was illegal.

Final Conclusion: The common detention orders were quashed, the appeals were allowed, and the detenus were directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Ratio Decidendi: A preventive detention order cannot stand on a bare and unexplained assertion of possible bail, and it is not justified where the ordinary criminal law is adequate to meet the situation.

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