Inclusive definition of coal covers coke in all forms, defeating inconsistent State levy and permit restrictions.

An inclusive statutory phrase such as "coal including coke in all its forms" was read as enlarging the definition of coal under section 14(ia) of the Central Sales Tax Act, so coke was treated as covered by the declared goods classification and the protection of section 15. On that basis, State levy, permit restrictions, and related notices under the Bihar Finance Act and connected rules could not proceed on the premise that coal and coke were separate taxable commodities. The impugned notices and directions to withhold permits and demand tax were therefore held unsustainable and were quashed.

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Issues: (i) Whether coke in any form falls within the expression "coal" in section 14(ia) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and consequently attracts the protection of section 15 of that Act and the related provisions of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981; (ii) Whether the impugned notices and orders restraining permit issuance and directing tax payment could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether coke in any form falls within the expression "coal" in section 14(ia) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and consequently attracts the protection of section 15 of that Act and the related provisions of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981.

Analysis: The expression "coal including coke in all its forms" was construed as an enlarging definition. The use of "including" was treated as distinct from the exhaustive phrase "that is to say", and the Court relied on the settled construction that the inclusive language expands the scope of the declared commodity. Coke was therefore not treated as a separate taxable commodity for the purpose of the Central Sales Tax Act. The Court further held that the State levy and the incidental restrictions in the Bihar Finance Act and the related notification had to conform to the central statutory protection governing declared goods and single-point taxation.

Conclusion: Coke in all its forms is included within "coal" under section 14(ia) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and the petitioners were entitled to the statutory protection flowing from that classification.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned notices and orders restraining permit issuance and directing tax payment could be sustained.

Analysis: The notices proceeded on the premise that coal and coke were distinct taxable goods, which was inconsistent with the central statutory position already settled by the Court. Since the foundation of the notices was contrary to law, and no separate legal basis survived under the State enactment or the sales tax rules for withholding permits on that footing, the challenge to the notices was upheld. The preliminary objection to the writ remedy was rejected as the impugned action had legal consequences and was capable of judicial review.

Conclusion: The impugned notices and consequential directions could not be sustained and were quashed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded because the impugned State action was inconsistent with the central statutory treatment of coke as included in coal, and the consequential tax demands and permit restrictions were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: An inclusive statutory expression such as "coal including coke in all its forms" enlarges the commodity definition so that coke is treated as part of coal, and any State levy or administrative action inconsistent with that central classification cannot stand.

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