Express statutory authority required for development fees; implied or ancillary power cannot justify fiscal levies.

A delegated development authority cannot impose a development fee unless the statute confers express fiscal power. Sections 90 and 91 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 authorised borrowing, funds, grants, loans, advances and application of funds for development purposes, but they did not create any express power to levy a fee. Incidental or ancillary powers cannot be stretched to authorise a fiscal charge, and fiscal exactions require clear statutory sanction with no room for intendment. The levy was therefore unsustainable because the authority lacked implied or delegated power to collect development fee.

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Issues: Whether the Development Authority had power to levy and collect development fee in the absence of an express statutory provision.

Analysis: The levy of a tax or fee in fiscal matters must rest on a specific statutory authorisation. A delegated authority cannot assume such power by implication merely because the fee is said to support development activity. Sections 90 and 91 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 provided for borrowing, funds, grants, loans, advances and application of funds for development purposes, but they did not confer an express power to impose development fee. The concept of incidental or ancillary power could not be extended to create a fiscal charge where the statute did not specifically provide for it. The decisions concerning compulsory exaction, fee and tax confirmed that there is no room for intendment in fiscal levies.

Conclusion: The Development Authority had no implied or delegated power to levy development fee, and the challenge to the levy failed against the respondents.

Ratio Decidendi: A delegated authority cannot impose a tax or fee in the absence of express statutory power, and fiscal levies cannot be sustained on the basis of implied, incidental or ancillary authority.

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