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Issues: Whether the period of limitation in section 32(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 applies to a fresh order passed by the Deputy Commissioner after remand by the Appellate Tribunal.
Analysis: Section 32(2) restricts the Deputy Commissioner's suo motu revisional power and bars orders after the prescribed period in original revision proceedings. The Tribunal had jurisdiction under section 36(3) to set aside and remand the matter for fresh consideration. Once the original revisional order was passed within time, the subsequent order made in obedience to the appellate remand stood on a different footing and was not controlled by the original limitation period. The same principle was supported by the analogy of remand orders under the Income-tax Act, where a fresh order pursuant to appellate or writ directions was held not to be confined by the original time limit.
Conclusion: The limitation in section 32(2) did not apply to the fresh order passed after remand, and the order of the Tribunal setting aside that order was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded, and the assessee's objection based on limitation failed.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory time limit governing original suo motu revisional action does not govern a fresh order passed in pursuance of a valid appellate remand, where the original order was within time and the remand itself was within the appellate authority's power.