Escaped assessment reopening requires fresh post-assessment information; a mere change of opinion cannot confer jurisdiction.

Delegation of the Commissioner's powers under section 19-A of the Assam Sales Tax Act to a Superintendent was held valid, as the statutory scheme and delegation rules did not bar delegation of that power; the notice was therefore not invalid on jurisdictional grounds, and the Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) objections also failed. However, proceedings for escaped assessment could be initiated only on information received after the original assessment, and the record showed that the reopening was based on material already considered earlier. Because the notice rested on a mere change of opinion rather than fresh information, it lacked jurisdiction and was quashed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Commissioner's powers under section 19-A of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 could validly be delegated to the Superintendent of Taxes and whether the notice issued by the Superintendent was without jurisdiction on that ground; (ii) Whether initiation of proceedings under section 19-A(1) was valid when the alleged escaped assessment was not founded on subsequent information but amounted only to a change of opinion.

Issue (i): Whether the Commissioner's powers under section 19-A of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 could validly be delegated to the Superintendent of Taxes and whether the notice issued by the Superintendent was without jurisdiction on that ground.

Analysis: The statutory scheme contemplated administration of the Act through a hierarchy of officers. Section 50 empowered the Commissioner to delegate his powers, subject to the restrictions in the rules. The rules restricted delegation of certain powers, but there was no bar on delegation of the power under section 19-A(1) to a Superintendent. The objection that section 19-A(2) became unworkable if the Commissioner's name was read as Superintendent was rejected, because a Superintendent could authorise subordinate officers to assist in investigation. The constitutional challenge based on Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) was also rejected in the facts of the case, since the notice was in fact issued by the Superintendent and no enforceable grievance arose on that footing.

Conclusion: The delegation was valid and the notice was not invalid on that ground; the challenge on Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) also failed.

Issue (ii): Whether initiation of proceedings under section 19-A(1) was valid when the alleged escaped assessment was not founded on subsequent information but amounted only to a change of opinion.

Analysis: The jurisdiction under section 19-A(1) depended upon information coming into the officer's possession after the original assessment and satisfaction founded on that later information. The records showed that the officer had already before him the material relating to the Price Control Order at the time of the original assessment and had referred to the fixed prices and related exclusions in his assessment order. The later notice was therefore not based on fresh information but on a reassessment of the same material, which amounted only to a change of opinion. Such a change of opinion could not satisfy the statutory condition precedent for reopening the assessment.

Conclusion: The notice under section 19-A(1) was without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The applications succeeded because the impugned reassessment notices were struck down for want of jurisdiction, while the other objections to delegation and constitutional validity were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Proceedings for escaped assessment can be initiated only on information received after the original assessment; a mere change of opinion on material already available on the record does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement for reopening.

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