Tribunal procedure may allow dismissal for default, but such power must be exercised sparingly and consistent with the parent Act.

A Tribunal regulation framed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act may validly permit dismissal of an appeal for non-prosecution or default of appearance if it is consistent with the parent Act and regulates procedure. The phrase "in disposing of an appeal" was read in its ordinary sense and not confined to disposal on the merits alone. The power to dismiss for default was described as one to be exercised carefully and sparingly. On the facts, the dismissals were unjustified because one matter was part-heard with adequate cause for adjournment and the others should not have been dismissed ex parte, so the matters were remitted for fresh hearing.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal had power under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, and the Regulations framed under it to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution or default of appearance; (ii) whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appeals for default in the facts of these cases.

Issue (i): Whether the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal had power under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, and the Regulations framed under it to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution or default of appearance.

Analysis: The power to frame regulations under section 30(4) was held to extend to procedure for regulating the Tribunal's business, including dismissal for default and readmission on sufficient cause. Section 36(3) was construed as using the expression "in disposing of an appeal" in its ordinary sense, so as not to confine disposal only to decisions on merits. The scheme of the Madras Act was distinguished from the Income-tax Act, and the regulation was found to be a valid procedural measure consistent with the Act and its scheme.

Conclusion: The Tribunal had power to dismiss an appeal for default, and Regulation 9 was valid.

Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appeals for default in the facts of these cases.

Analysis: On the facts, one appeal was part-heard and there was adequate reason for adjournment, while in the other matters the ex parte dismissal ought to have been set aside. The power to dismiss for default was stated to be one that should be exercised carefully and sparingly to advance justice.

Conclusion: The dismissals for default were not justified and were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were required to be heard afresh by the Tribunal, and the petitioners obtained relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A regulation framed under a statutory power to regulate Tribunal procedure may validly authorize dismissal of an appeal for default if it is consistent with the parent Act, and the expression "in disposing of an appeal" need not be confined to disposal on merits alone.

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