Limitation under a special sales tax statute may exclude bona fide time spent in restoration proceedings before revision filing.

Under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, the majority view allowed exclusion of time spent bona fide in prosecuting restoration applications after dismissal of appeals in default while computing limitation for revisions. The court treated the restoration proceedings as civil proceedings and held that, where the special statute did not expressly exclude the general limitation rules, the principle underlying section 14(2) of the Limitation Act could be applied through section 29(2). The assessee's due diligence and good faith were material, and the revisions were treated as within limitation. A dissenting view rejected application of section 29(2) and denied exclusion of that period.

---

---

Issues: Whether, in computing the limitation for filing revisions under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, the period spent in prosecuting restoration applications after dismissal of the appeals in default could be excluded by applying section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, or the principle underlying it.

Analysis: The revisional remedy under the special sales tax statute was held to attract section 29(2) of the Limitation Act only if the statutory scheme permitted application of sections 4 to 24 and did not expressly exclude them. The majority held that the proceedings for restoration of the appeals were civil proceedings, and that the appellate and revisional authorities, though quasi-judicial, need not be treated as courts in the strict sense for the purpose of extending the principle of section 14(2). It was further held that the principle underlying section 14(2) could be applied to exclude the time bona fide spent in prosecuting the restoration applications, because the assessee had pursued that remedy with due diligence and in good faith, and the special limitation provision did not exclude that principle.

Conclusion: The period spent in prosecuting the restoration applications was excludible, and the revisions were treated as within limitation in favour of the assessee.

Concurring Opinion: Another member agreed with the affirmative answer and added that, even apart from reframing the question, section 29(2) of the Limitation Act could support the result.

Dissenting Opinion: One member held that the revisional authority under the U.P. Sales Tax Act was not a court, that section 29(2) did not apply to the revision proceedings, and that the period could not be excluded either under section 14(2) or by analogy.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes limitation without expressly excluding the general limitation provisions, the principle underlying section 14(2) of the Limitation Act may be applied to exclude time bona fide spent in prosecuting another civil proceeding, even before a quasi-judicial tax tribunal.

---