Implied stay power in tax appeals was unavailable after express statutory authority was inserted, limiting tribunal jurisdiction.

A statutory tribunal of limited jurisdiction can exercise only powers conferred by the enactment, and any implied power must be incidental to effective appellate jurisdiction. Before the 1968 amendment, the Sales Tax Tribunal could rely on incidental stay power in second appeal because no express stay mechanism existed. After section 13(5) was amended to confer express stay authority on the Commissioner, implying the same power in the Tribunal was no longer justified and would undermine the statutory time limit and the express proviso. The Tribunal was therefore held to have no implied power to grant stay during the pendency of the second appeal, and the stay order was liable to be quashed.

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Issues: Whether the Sales Tax Tribunal had implied power to grant stay during the pendency of a second appeal after the insertion of an express power enabling the Commissioner to stay recovery.

Analysis: The Tribunal's power to grant stay was not available as an inherent power, since a statutory tribunal of limited jurisdiction can act only within the powers conferred by the enactment. Prior to the 1968 amendment, no express stay power existed during second appeals, and the Tribunal could invoke implied power as incidental and ancillary to effective appellate jurisdiction. Once section 13(5), proviso, was inserted and express authority to grant stay was conferred on the Commissioner, the need for implying the same power in the Tribunal disappeared. Allowing the Tribunal to exercise an implied stay power would also cut across the statutory restriction requiring an application within the prescribed time and would render the express proviso ineffective.

Conclusion: The Tribunal had no implied power to grant stay during the pendency of the second appeal after the 1968 amendment; the impugned stay order was liable to be quashed.

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