Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) Whether a writ of prohibition could be issued at the threshold against the proposed assessment proceedings for want of jurisdictional facts and availability of alternative remedy; (ii) Whether proceedings could validly be continued against a dissolved association of persons in the absence of an express charging or enabling provision; (iii) Whether the impugned notice proposing best judgment assessment was sustainable when no material showed a sale or purchase within the State.
Issue (i): Whether a writ of prohibition could be issued at the threshold against the proposed assessment proceedings for want of jurisdictional facts and availability of alternative remedy.
Analysis: A writ of prohibition lies where the assessing authority is shown to be acting without jurisdiction or without the statutory power to proceed. The existence of jurisdiction depends on foundational facts, and if no prima facie material exists to show that such facts are present, the High Court may restrain the proceedings at inception. The mere availability of appeal or revision after an illegal assessment does not bar interference where the very assumption of jurisdiction is challenged as patently unsustainable.
Conclusion: The writ was maintainable and the plea of alternative remedy failed.
Issue (ii): Whether proceedings could validly be continued against a dissolved association of persons in the absence of an express charging or enabling provision.
Analysis: The liability of former members may survive only where the statute expressly so provides, but such liability does not by itself create power to assess a dissolved entity. Section 19(3) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 was held to be declaratory of the liability of former members and not a charging provision authorising assessment of a dissolved association after dissolution. In the absence of an express provision enabling assessment of the dissolved association, the authority could not assume jurisdiction on the basis of implication.
Conclusion: Proceedings against the dissolved association were not legally sustainable.
Issue (iii): Whether the impugned notice proposing best judgment assessment was sustainable when no material showed a sale or purchase within the State.
Analysis: Taxation on sales could arise only if there was material to show an actual sale by identifiable parties within the taxing State. Bare assumptions that the imported goods must have been sold to local buyers were insufficient, especially when the petitioners repeatedly sought disclosure of the basis of the allegation and no particulars were furnished. A best judgment process cannot be initiated on conjecture; the authority must first possess circumstances which reasonably suggest a taxable sale or purchase. In their absence, the notice was founded on non-existent jurisdictional facts.
Conclusion: The impugned notice was without authority and could not be sustained.
Final Conclusion: The assessment proceedings were quashed because the authority lacked jurisdictional material, could not proceed against the dissolved association, and could not invoke best judgment on mere suspicion.
Ratio Decidendi: A taxing authority cannot initiate or continue assessment proceedings unless the statute expressly authorises it and the jurisdictional facts showing a taxable event are established; absent such material, a writ of prohibition may issue at the threshold, including against proceedings directed at a dissolved association of persons.