Issues: Whether clearance of Nitrous Oxide I.P. to traders was eligible for the concessional rate under Sl. No. 17 of Notification No. 2/2011-CE.

Analysis: Sl. No. 17 describes the eligible goods as "Anaesthetics" falling under Chapters 28, 29 or 30, without imposing an end-use requirement, purchaser-specific restriction, or certification condition. Nitrous Oxide I.P. was undisputedly manufactured as a pharmacopoeial-grade medical anaesthetic. Its character was determinable at manufacture and clearance, not by the identity of the purchaser or subsequent use. An end-use condition could not be introduced by implication into an unconditional, product-specific exemption. Further, the allegation of non-medical diversion of supplies to traders was unsupported by evidence, while the trader's declaration confirming medical sales remained unrebutted.

Conclusion: Nitrous Oxide I.P. cleared to traders was eligible for the concessional rate under Sl. No. 17 of Notification No. 2/2011-CE; the demand, interest and penalties founded on denial of that benefit could not survive.

Issues: Whether the show-cause notice issued for proceedings under Section 73(1) could be interfered with in writ jurisdiction on the assertion that GST had been paid to the supplier of rental services.

Analysis: The questions whether GST was paid to the supplier and whether the supplier duly furnished returns were factual matters falling for adjudication by the Proper Officer. The notice was founded on the Proper Officer's opinion regarding the existence of facts warranting proceedings under Section 73, and disclosed no jurisdictional error. The taxpayer may place its factual and legal contentions in its reply; the period during which the notice remained stayed was directed to be excluded for computing the limitation for an order under Section 73.

Conclusion: The challenge to the show-cause notice fails; no jurisdictional error is established. The finding is against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether continued sealing of the office premises after completion of search and seizure was authorised by Section 67(4) of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the prohibitory order covering office equipment, files and other articles was valid under Section 67(2) of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (iii) Whether seized books, documents and things could remain in the petitioner's custody.

Issue (i): Whether continued sealing of the office premises after completion of search and seizure was authorised by Section 67(4) of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 67(4) empowers the officer authorised under Section 67(2) to seal or break open premises, containers or devices only where access is denied and for carrying out search and seizure. There was no material showing denial of access. The provision does not authorise continued sealing after completion of search or use of the premises as a place for retaining seized material.

Conclusion: The continued sealing of the office premises was illegal and unauthorised, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the prohibitory order covering office equipment, files and other articles was valid under Section 67(2) of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 67(2), read with Rule 139(4), permits a prohibitory order only where confiscable goods cannot practicably be seized. The listed articles, including computers, laptops, files, printer, refrigerator, air conditioners, inverter and batteries, were office-use articles and were not goods liable to confiscation on the facts found.

Conclusion: The prohibitory order was invalid and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether seized books, documents and things could remain in the petitioner's custody.

Analysis: Books, documents and things seized under Section 67(2) are to remain with the authorised officer for so long as necessary for examination, inquiry or proceedings. Their return to the petitioner immediately upon seizure was inconsistent with that statutory scheme. If still required, the material could be taken into official custody upon issuance of a fresh seizure order relating back to the original seizure date.

Conclusion: Seized books, documents and things, if required for statutory proceedings, must be retained by the authorities rather than left in the petitioner's custody.

Final Conclusion: The search power under Section 67 is confined to its statutory purpose and cannot be used to continue sealing business premises or restrain dealings with articles that are not liable to confiscation.

Ratio Decidendi: The power to seal under Section 67(4) is ancillary to an ongoing search and is exercisable only upon denial of access; it does not authorise post-search sealing of premises for preservation or storage of seized material.

Issues: (i) Whether uncoated paper under tariff item 48025590 used for manufacture of exercise books and notebooks is covered by the exemption under Entry No. 128 of Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025; (ii) Whether purchaser declarations, purchase orders and contractual stipulations establish entitlement to that exemption and can be approved through an advance ruling.

Issue (i): Whether uncoated paper under tariff item 48025590 used for manufacture of exercise books and notebooks is covered by the exemption under Entry No. 128 of Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.

Analysis: Entry No. 128 exempts uncoated paper and paperboard used for exercise books, graph books, laboratory notebooks and notebooks. The corresponding taxable entry in Schedule II to Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 excludes paper used for those specified purposes, creating a use-based distinction within Heading 4802. The exemption must nevertheless be construed according to its terms and applies only where the specified end-use is factually fulfilled.

Conclusion: Uncoated paper under tariff item 48025590 is exempt under Entry No. 128 when it is used for exercise books, graph books, laboratory notebooks or notebooks; it is not exempt merely by reason of its tariff classification. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether purchaser declarations, purchase orders and contractual stipulations establish entitlement to that exemption and can be approved through an advance ruling.

Analysis: The notification uses the expression "used for" and contains no deeming provision, prescribed certification process, bond, verification arrangement, monitoring mechanism or recovery procedure for diversion. Purchaser declarations and contractual documents may evidence intended use but do not conclusively establish actual end-use. Recognising them as determinative would introduce an evidentiary and compliance mechanism absent from the notification. The jurisdiction under Section 97(2) and Section 98 does not extend to creating such a procedure or prescribing standards for proving end-use.

Conclusion: Purchaser declarations, purchase orders and similar documents do not by themselves establish entitlement to exemption, and no advance ruling can be issued on the procedure or manner of availing it. This conclusion is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption remains conditional upon actual specified use, while the requested validation of documentary arrangements for establishing that use is unavailable under the advance-ruling jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: An end-use exemption must be applied strictly according to its text; absent statutory machinery deeming or verifying intended use, an advance-ruling authority cannot treat private declarations as conclusive proof or create a compliance mechanism.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings for the relevant assessment year could validly be initiated on the basis of erroneous bank information alleging term deposits exceeding the statutory threshold for reopening beyond three years.

Analysis: The information forming the sole basis of the notice under Section 148A(b) was admittedly incorrect: the reported term deposit of Rs. 12.50 crore was actually Rs. 12.50 lakh due to a technical or system error by the bank. The actual alleged escaped income was below Rs. 50 lakh. Under the post-Finance Act, 2021 reassessment regime, reopening after three years is permissible only where the prescribed statutory conditions for the extended period, including evidence of escaped income represented in the specified manner amounting to at least Rs. 50 lakh, are fulfilled. A notice founded on materially false information could not constitute an effective show-cause notice or sustain reassessment jurisdiction beyond the normal limitation period.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148A(b), the consequential reassessment notice and orders, including the assessment and penalty orders, were invalid and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Modification of the interim direction restraining processing of income-tax returns filed by sitting judges under the new regime.

Analysis: The automated processing system could not independently identify returns filed by judges. Identification details were therefore required to be furnished so that the relevant returns could be excluded from processing, while avoiding disruption to processing of other returns. No final adjudication of the writ petition took place.

Outcome: The modification application was disposed of; the writ petition remains pending.

Issues: (i) Whether enhancement of the assessable value and consequential differential-duty demand based on valuation of identical goods were sustainable; (ii) Whether confiscation, redemption fine and penalty for alleged misdeclaration were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether enhancement of the assessable value and consequential differential-duty demand based on valuation of identical goods were sustainable.

Analysis: The declared goods were brass scrap of ISRI specification 'Pallu', and the tariff coverage of brass scrap included several varieties of brass scrap. Neither the tariff nor the applicable specifications established that the length or uniformity of the brass tubes excluded them from brass scrap. The departmental assessment contradicted the chartered engineer's report on serviceability. Further, the authorities did not provide particulars or documentary evidence of contemporaneous imports of identical goods to support valuation under Rule 5.

Conclusion: Enhancement of value and the consequential differential-duty demand were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether confiscation, redemption fine and penalty for alleged misdeclaration were sustainable.

Analysis: The departmental conclusion that the goods were serviceable pipes rather than declared scrap rested only on visual inspection and was not supported by expert evidence or material establishing misdeclaration. The expert report indicated that the imported tubes were rejected or discarded and not serviceable. In the absence of proof of misdeclaration, the statutory basis for confiscation and consequential penal action was not established.

Conclusion: Confiscation, redemption fine and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessed customs liability, confiscatory consequences and penal consequences founded on the alleged misdeclaration and unsupported valuation were annulled.

Ratio Decidendi: A declared transaction value cannot be displaced under the identical-goods valuation method, nor can confiscation for misdeclaration be sustained, without reliable evidence of misdeclaration and contemporaneous identical-goods value; unsupported visual inspection cannot prevail over contrary expert material.

Issues: (i) Whether money-laundering proceedings survive where the original scheduled-offence FIR is quashed on the basis of a compromise; (ii) Whether the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 apply despite the original FIR involving a small amount; (iii) Whether parity with a co-accused granted bail was available; (iv) Whether the applicant satisfied the requirements for grant of bail.

Issue (i): Whether money-laundering proceedings survive where the original scheduled-offence FIR is quashed on the basis of a compromise.

Analysis: An acquittal, discharge, or quashing on merits which establishes that no scheduled offence occurred negates the existence of proceeds of crime and consequential money-laundering action. A quashing based on compromise, however, does not determine that no criminal proceeds were generated. The alleged compromise was also prima facie doubtful, and the ECIR had been supplemented by 24 connected FIRs concerning the larger alleged fraud. The money-laundering investigation was not confined to the individual complainant's settled grievance.

Conclusion: The money-laundering proceedings survive notwithstanding compromise-based quashing of the original FIR.

Issue (ii): Whether the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 apply despite the original FIR involving a small amount.

Analysis: The proceeds of crime and the offence of money-laundering are not restricted to the amount stated in one predicate FIR. The statutory definition covers property derived or obtained directly or indirectly from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, and the Enforcement Directorate may investigate connected dealings with such proceeds beyond the scope or amount investigated by the predicate-offence agency.

Conclusion: Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 applies.

Issue (iii): Whether parity with a co-accused granted bail was available.

Analysis: The co-accused's bail was granted on circumstances materially distinct from those attributed to the applicant. The available material prima facie identified the applicant as the principal operator of the forex and cash-conversion mechanism through entities allegedly controlled by him.

Conclusion: The applicant cannot claim parity with the co-accused who was granted bail.

Issue (iv): Whether the applicant satisfied the requirements for grant of bail.

Analysis: The material, including statements recorded under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, banking transactions, alleged use of dummy directors, and cash and foreign-exchange dealings, prima facie disclosed a formidable case of involvement in laundering proceeds of crime. The applicant's non-disclosure of Enforcement Directorate summons while obtaining foreign-travel permission, alleged failure to comply with travel conditions, and attempted overseas travel supported the finding of flight risk. The applicant consequently failed both the conventional bail assessment and the statutory twin conditions requiring reasonable grounds to believe that he was not guilty and unlikely to commit an offence while on bail.

Conclusion: The applicant did not satisfy the conditions for release on bail.

Final Conclusion: Compromise-based closure of an individual predicate complaint does not extinguish a money-laundering investigation into an allegedly wider scheme, and the prima facie material and flight-risk assessment precluded bail.

Ratio Decidendi: A compromise-based quashing of a scheduled-offence case does not bar money-laundering proceedings unless it conclusively establishes that no proceeds of crime existed; bail under Section 45 requires satisfaction of both statutory twin conditions on the available material.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable for reversal of CENVAT credit attributable to trading activity; (ii) whether discussion of the doctrine of demurrer was necessary to decide the appeal.

Analysis: The Members concurred that credit exclusively attributable to trading activity was inadmissible, that the reversal required re-quantification under the prescribed trading formula, that the short-payment demand was time-barred, and that proportionate credit relating to rented premises used for taxable services was admissible. They differed on limitation: the Member (Technical) treated the Supreme Court-approved view on trading credit as requiring invocation of the extended period, whereas the Member (Judicial) considered the issue interpretational, noted the asserted disclosure in records and conflicting authorities, and concluded that the extended period and penalties were unavailable. The Members also differed on whether the doctrine of demurrer was germane.

Outcome: The divergent questions were referred to the President for constitution of the statutory mechanism for resolution by a Third Member.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised against cancellation of GST registration where disputed factual issues exist and statutory remedies of revocation and appeal are available.

Analysis: The allegation concerning wrongful availment of input tax credit and breach of the registration conditions involves factual issues requiring examination of evidence. No inherent jurisdictional defect in the show-cause proceedings was established. The available remedies of revocation of cancellation and statutory appeal provide the appropriate forums for factual adjudication.

Outcome: Interference under Article 226 was declined; the petitioner was permitted to pursue revocation, with a direction for expeditious reasoned consideration of a timely application.

Issues: Whether the eighteen-month period for an Interim Board to decide a pending settlement application commences upon its first allotment to an Interim Board or upon a subsequent administrative transfer, and whether that period is mandatory.

Analysis: Section 245D(4A)(iii), read with Sections 245D(9)(iii) and 245M(2), treats the relevant allotment date as the date of receipt of a pending application by the Interim Board. The application had already been allotted to and acted upon by the Delhi Interim Board, which exercised jurisdiction under Section 245D(3) and called for the Rule 9 report. Under Clause 6(ii) of the e-Settlement Scheme, 2021, such action could occur only after allotment. The later movement of the file to the Chennai Interim Board was an administrative transfer and could not restart or extend the statutory period; otherwise, repeated transfers could indefinitely enlarge the prescribed time. The settled position applied was that the eighteen-month period is mandatory, and an order made after its expiry is without jurisdiction and a nullity. On either the initial allotment date or, at the latest, the date on which the Rule 9 report was sought, the impugned order was beyond time.

Conclusion: The eighteen-month period is mandatory and commenced when the application was first allotted to and acted upon by the Delhi Interim Board, not on its subsequent transfer to the Chennai Interim Board; the orders passed after expiry of that period were time-barred and without jurisdiction, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a steamer agent that lodged and verified the Import General Manifest was liable to penalty for deficiency and misdeclaration of imported goods under Section 116 of the Customs Act.

Analysis: Sections 2(31), 30, 31, 116 and 148 of the Customs Act treat the person acting for the person-in-charge of a conveyance, including an accepted agent dealing with cargo, as liable where manifested cargo is not unloaded or the deficiency is not satisfactorily accounted for. Lodgment of the Import General Manifest carries a verified declaration as to its truth and identifies the lodging agent as acting for the master of the vessel. The substantial discrepancy between the manifested quantities and the goods actually found in 150 containers was not satisfactorily explained. Contractual stipulations in bills of lading that cargo particulars were supplied by the shipper and unchecked by the carrier could not override statutory obligations. The Tribunal had not adequately addressed these facts or the governing principle on agent liability.

Conclusion: The steamer agent was liable to penalty under Section 116 of the Customs Act for failure to file an accurate and complete Import General Manifest and to satisfactorily account for the deficiency in manifested goods.

Issues: Whether the open-ended continuation of suspension of a Customs Cargo Service Provider approval under Regulation 11(2) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009 was legally sustainable.

Analysis: Regulation 11(2) authorises immediate suspension only as an exceptional preventive measure where objectively supported circumstances establish an urgent and continuing threat requiring intervention without awaiting the inquiry procedure. It is distinct from suspension or revocation under Regulation 11(1), which requires observance of the procedural safeguards under Regulation 12. A preventive suspension cannot be continued indefinitely merely because an investigation remains pending; its continuance requires a demonstrated subsisting necessity, timely verification of alleged deficiencies, and consideration of less restrictive measures. Here, no notice or inquiry under Regulation 12 had commenced despite more than 100 days of suspension; the claimed corrective measures had not been verified; Customs officers remained posted at the facility; and more than 3,000 containers were cleared during suspension without reported incident. The available material did not establish an ongoing immediate risk warranting continued preventive suspension, while enhanced supervision and conditions could protect revenue and security interests proportionately.

Conclusion: The indefinite continuation of suspension under Regulation 11(2) was unsustainable; the approval was required to be restored, without precluding lawful proceedings under Regulation 11(1) following the prescribed inquiry.

Issues: Whether continuation of suspension of a Customs Broker licence was lawful where the post-decisional hearing mandated within fifteen days of suspension was conducted after expiry of that period.

Analysis: Regulation 16 creates an exceptional preventive power distinct from the regular inquiry procedure under Regulation 17. Immediate suspension requires both a pending or contemplated inquiry and recorded satisfaction that urgent intervention is necessary. As the initial suspension is made without a prior hearing, Regulation 16(2) mandates a post-decisional hearing within fifteen days; this safeguard is compulsory and cannot be extended administratively. The hearing was deferred by the licensing authority and ultimately conducted beyond the prescribed period, without any adjournment being attributable to the Customs Broker. The departmental instructions also require strict adherence to the prescribed procedure and timelines.

Conclusion: The delayed post-decisional hearing violated the mandatory requirement of Regulation 16(2); consequently, the order continuing suspension was unsustainable and the suspension stood revoked with immediate effect.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax erroneously paid by the service provider under Mining Service for supply of floating rigs could be refunded to the service recipient without the service provider challenging the assessment; (ii) Whether the one-year limitation for refund claims applied where tax was paid under a mistake of law; (iii) Whether the respondent established absence of unjust enrichment; (iv) Whether the appellate authorities and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to grant refund for tax paid under a mistake of law.

Issue (i): Whether service tax erroneously paid by the service provider under Mining Service for supply of floating rigs could be refunded to the service recipient without the service provider challenging the assessment.

Analysis: Supply and operation of floating rigs was classifiable as Supply of Tangible Goods Service, which became taxable only from 16.05.2008, and not as Mining Service for the disputed period. The tax passed on by the service provider to the recipient was consequently collected without legal authority. The recipient, having borne the tax incidence, was entitled to seek its refund notwithstanding that the service provider had not separately challenged the classification assessment.

Conclusion: The service recipient was eligible for refund of service tax erroneously paid under Mining Service; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the one-year limitation for refund claims applied where tax was paid under a mistake of law.

Analysis: Retention of tax collected through an erroneous classification, where no levy was legally attracted, was inconsistent with Article 265 of the Constitution of India. The limitation under Section 11B was held inapplicable to refund of service tax paid through ignorance or mistake of law.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not barred by limitation; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the respondent established absence of unjust enrichment.

Analysis: Certificates of the service provider and the entity for whom the exploration activity was undertaken supported the finding that the service tax burden had been passed to and borne by the respondent. The concurrent factual finding on the absence of further passing on of the incidence was not shown to warrant interference.

Conclusion: Refund to the respondent would not result in unjust enrichment; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the appellate authorities and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to grant refund for tax paid under a mistake of law.

Analysis: As the appeal proceedings contained established findings on erroneous classification, payment of tax, and the incidence borne by the respondent, requiring recourse to a civil suit or writ petition would be futile. The statutory appellate authorities were competent to rectify the classification error and order refund in the circumstances.

Conclusion: The appellate authorities and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to grant the refund; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Tax collected on supply of floating rigs before the taxable entry for Supply of Tangible Goods Service came into force was liable to be refunded to the recipient who bore its incidence, without limitation or unjust-enrichment impediment.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax paid under an erroneous classification where no lawful levy existed cannot be retained consistently with Article 265, and a recipient who proves that it bore the incidence may obtain refund notwithstanding the ordinary limitation provision.

Issues: (i) Whether refund of IGST paid on exports to Bhutan could be denied solely because shipping bills were not filed; (ii) Whether penalty for non-filing of shipping bills was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether refund of IGST paid on exports to Bhutan could be denied solely because shipping bills were not filed.

Analysis: The tax invoices established payment of IGST, while the Bhutan invoices, sealing endorsements by CGST officers, examination at the land customs station, and Bhutan import declarations established export and receipt of the consignments. Although the revised procedure required shipping bills, the exports occurred immediately after introduction of the GST regime and were processed by departmental and customs officers without objection. The failure to file shipping bills was therefore a procedural lapse and did not displace the established fact of export or IGST payment.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to refund of the IGST paid, with applicable interest for delayed refund.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for non-filing of shipping bills was sustainable.

Analysis: The exporter had followed the earlier documentation procedure, and the consignments had been sealed and permitted to cross the border by CGST and customs officers without being directed to follow the revised shipping-bill procedure. The lapse was consequently attributable also to the departmental authorities.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Documentary proof of export and tax payment prevailed over the procedural omission in the transitional period following implementation of the GST regime.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural omission in export documentation cannot defeat an IGST refund or justify penalty where export, payment of tax, and substantive compliance are established by reliable contemporaneous records.

Issues: (i) Whether reimbursement of employee operating costs by group companies was taxable as Business Support Service; (ii) Whether consideration from multi-function printer arrangements was taxable as Business Support Service; (iii) Whether the value of course material supplied to independent training operators was taxable as Commercial Training or Coaching Service; (iv) Whether amounts received under the Intel Inside programme were taxable as Advertising Agency Service; (v) Whether abatement for goods supplied under comprehensive service and maintenance contracts was available; (vi) Whether the extended period could be invoked for demand up to September 2014; (vii) Whether service-tax demands for 1 July 2012 to September 2013 could be sustained under provisions rendered inapplicable by the negative-list regime.

Issue (i): Whether reimbursement of employee operating costs by group companies was taxable as Business Support Service.

Analysis: Business Support Service covered outsourced business functions. The group companies had not outsourced any function; they merely reimbursed costs of employees deployed for common group activities. Sharing or reimbursement of such expenditure did not constitute consideration for a taxable service, and reimbursed expenses could not be included in taxable value through Rule 5 of the Service Tax Valuation Rules.

Conclusion: The employee-cost reimbursement was not taxable as Business Support Service, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether consideration from multi-function printer arrangements was taxable as Business Support Service.

Analysis: The printers were installed at customers' premises and remained in their possession and use for the contractual period. The arrangement transferred the right to use the equipment and amounted to a deemed sale. Further, documentary material established VAT payment on spare parts, toner and consumables, rendering their value eligible for exclusion under Notification No. 12/2003-ST dated 20.06.2003.

Conclusion: The printer arrangement and the value of goods supplied thereunder were not liable to service tax as Business Support Service, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the value of course material supplied to independent training operators was taxable as Commercial Training or Coaching Service.

Analysis: Independent service providers operated the career development centres, enrolled students and provided training. The assessee only sold course material to those providers. In any event, separately identifiable goods sold during provision of training were excluded from taxable value under Notification No. 12/2003-ST dated 20.06.2003.

Conclusion: No service tax was payable on the value of course material, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether amounts received under the Intel Inside programme were taxable as Advertising Agency Service.

Analysis: Advertising Agency Service required involvement in making, preparing, displaying or exhibiting advertisements in the relevant statutory sense. The assessee merely displayed Intel's supplied logo on computers it manufactured and undertook no designing, conceptualising or visualising of the advertisement.

Conclusion: Display of the supplied Intel logo did not constitute Advertising Agency Service and was not taxable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether abatement for goods supplied under comprehensive service and maintenance contracts was available.

Analysis: Toner, developer, spares and consumables were supplied in performing maintenance contracts. The invoices and certificate established payment of VAT on those goods, and no Cenvat credit had been availed on them. The conditions for exclusion of the value of goods under Notification No. 12/2003-ST dated 20.06.2003 were therefore fulfilled.

Conclusion: Abatement for the value of goods supplied in the maintenance contracts was available, and the related service-tax demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether the extended period could be invoked for demand up to September 2014.

Analysis: The show-cause notice was issued in October 2015 on the basis of a special audit and information already available to the department since 2012. The delay in issuing the notice did not support invocation of the extended limitation period.

Conclusion: The demand up to September 2014 was barred by limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether service-tax demands for 1 July 2012 to September 2013 could be sustained under provisions rendered inapplicable by the negative-list regime.

Analysis: After 1 July 2012, demands could not be confirmed by invoking the earlier positive-list service categories under Section 65(105). The show-cause notice and adjudication had relied on provisions that no longer governed levy after the negative-list regime commenced.

Conclusion: The demand for 1 July 2012 to September 2013 founded on the non-existent positive-list provisions was untenable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: All disputed service-tax demands lacked legal sustainability; the consequential interest and penalties could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Reimbursements without outsourced services, transactions constituting transfer of the right to use goods, and documented goods sold during taxable activities cannot be subjected to service tax beyond the statutory charge and valuation framework; a demand must also be raised under the provisions applicable to the relevant period and within limitation.

Issues: Whether rejection of the application for revocation of GST registration cancellation warranted fresh consideration after the taxpayer filed pending returns, paid taxes and deposited late fees.

Analysis: The cancellation of registration was found capable of causing civil death to the taxpayer's business. Since the pending returns were filed within fifteen days of cancellation, taxes were paid and late fees were subsequently deposited, the request for revocation required reconsideration by the competent authority. Remitting the matter to that authority, rather than the appellate authority, was considered appropriate.

Conclusion: The rejection of revocation and the appellate order were set aside, and the revocation application was remitted to the competent authority for fresh decision. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether uploading a notice or order-in-original under the 'View Additional Notices and Orders' tab on the GST common portal constitutes valid service under Sections 169 and 146 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Service by uploading on the common portal alone is not sufficient unless the assessee acknowledges receipt or responds to the notice. The retrospective amendment concerning functions performable on the common portal does not alter this position, since the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 do not prescribe the common portal as a mode for formal service of a show-cause notice or order. A mode of communication producing serious civil consequences cannot substitute statutory service merely through portal uploading.

Conclusion: Uploading the notice or order-in-original only on the common portal does not amount to valid service on the assessee; the writ petition was governed by the relief framework applicable to such defective service.