Revisional jurisdiction without statutory limitation cannot be cut off by a rigid practice period and must be decided on merits.

Where section 21(3) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 conferred revisional power "at any time" and prescribed no statutory limitation, the Financial Commissioner could not treat an assumed 90-day practice as an absolute bar to revision. A reasonable rule of practice for ordinary filing could exist, but it could not override the statute or justify dismissal in limine without considering the facts. The Court therefore held that the revision petition was not rightly rejected as time-barred and had to be examined on merits, answering the referred questions in favour of the assessee.

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Issues: Whether the Financial Commissioner was bound to decide the revision on merits in the absence of any statutory period of limitation under section 21(3) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, and whether dismissal of the revision in limine as time-barred was justified.

Analysis: The statutory language of section 21(3) conferred revisional power on the Financial Commissioner "at any time" and did not prescribe any fixed period of limitation. The dismissal of the revision proceeded on an assumed practice of 90 days, but the Court held that such practice could not be treated as a statutory bar. In the absence of a prescribed limitation period, a rigid insistence on delay without a flexible consideration of the facts was not warranted. The reference to the statement of case under section 22(3) was noted, but the Court declined remand and answered the legal questions on the available record. The Court also clarified that a reasonable rule of practice for normal invocation of revisional jurisdiction could still exist, but it could not operate as an absolute limitation.

Conclusion: The Financial Commissioner was not justified in dismissing the revision petition in limine on the ground of delay, and the revision had to be considered on merits. The questions referred were answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reference was answered by holding that, where no statutory limitation exists, revisional power cannot be denied merely by applying a rigid practice period as an absolute bar, and the matter was required to be decided on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of a statutory period of limitation, a tribunal vested with revisional jurisdiction may follow a reasonable practice for normal filing, but it cannot treat that practice as an inflexible limitation bar so as to reject a revision without considering the facts of the case.

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