Limitation starts on actual communication of an appellate order, not on prior notice of the pronouncement date.

Limitation for a reference application under section 44(1) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, begins only when the appellate order is actually communicated by supply or service of a copy. The statutory scheme, read with the related provisions and rules, requires transmission of the order itself to the aggrieved dealer; mere knowledge that the order was passed, or prior notice of the date fixed for pronouncement, is not sufficient. On that interpretation, applications rejected as time-barred on the basis of the pronouncement date were wrongly refused and had to be entertained in accordance with law.

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Issues: Whether, for an application for reference under section 44(1) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, time begins to run only when a copy of the appellate order is actually communicated to the dealer, and whether the Board could treat prior notice of the date of pronouncement as sufficient communication.

Analysis: The statutory language in section 44(1) required the application to be filed within sixty days from the date of communication by the Tribunal of its order. Read with sections 38(4) and 39(3), and with rules 36, 61 and 63(4) to (5), the scheme of the Act contemplated service or supply of a copy of every appellate order to the aggrieved party. The expression "communication" was held to mean actual transmission of the order itself, not merely knowledge that the order had been passed or constructive notice inferred from the fixing of a date for pronouncement. Prior notice of the date on which the Board intended to pass orders did not alter the statutory starting point for limitation.

Conclusion: Time under section 44(1) begins only on actual communication of the order by supply or service of a copy, and the Board's view that limitation ran from the date fixed for pronouncement was incorrect.

Final Conclusion: The applications for reference were wrongly rejected as time-barred, and the Board was directed to entertain and decide them according to law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute prescribes limitation from the date of communication of an order, limitation commences only upon actual communication of the order itself, and not upon mere knowledge, notice of the date of decision, or constructive communication.

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