Sales tax exemption notifications may use "person" in its popular sense, excluding a partnership firm from the benefit.

The exemption Government Order was construed strictly on its own language and context, and the General Clauses Act definition of "person" was not imported where it conflicted with the statutory scheme. Because the sales tax law distinguished between a "person" and a "firm", and the exemption pattern treated classes of persons separately from classes of goods, the word "person" in the notification was read in its popular sense. A partnership firm was therefore not covered by the exemption for persons owning or having an interest in hand-oil presses and dealing exclusively in their produce, and the assessee-firm was denied exemption on that footing.

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Issues: Whether the word "person" in the exemption Government Order included a partnership firm, so as to entitle the assessee-firm to the sales tax exemption for persons owning or having an interest in hand-oil presses and dealing exclusively in their produce.

Analysis: The exemption under section 6(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 had to be read according to its own language and context. The definition of "person" in the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891 could not be mechanically imported where the subject and context showed repugnancy. The Act itself distinguished between a "person" and a "firm" in the definition of "dealer", and the pattern of exemptions issued by the Government showed that exemptions to specified classes of persons were treated separately from exemptions to specified classes of goods. The partnership law context also showed that a firm is only a compendious name for the partners and not a separate juristic person. The word "person" in the Government Order was therefore used in its popular sense and not as including a firm.

Conclusion: The assessee-firm was not covered by the expression "person" in the Government Order and was not entitled to the exemption on that footing.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded and the Tribunal's view was set aside because the exemption order was construed as confined to an individual person and not to a partnership firm.

Ratio Decidendi: A definition in a General Clauses Act applies only when it is not repugnant to the subject or context of the provision or order being construed, and the word "person" in a sales tax exemption notification may be confined to its popular meaning where the surrounding statutory scheme distinguishes it from a firm.

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