Limitation under U.P. Sales Tax Act runs from actual refusal, and time spent obtaining copies is excluded.

Limitation under Section 11(2)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act runs from the date of the Revising Authority's actual refusal to make a reference, because the phrase "within thirty days of such refusal" does not defer time to service of notice unless the statute says so expressly. The Court also applied the earlier Division Bench ruling that time spent obtaining requisite copies is excludable in computing limitation. On that basis, the application was treated as within time and the matter was directed to proceed.

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Issues: (i) Whether an application under Section 11(2)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 had to be filed within thirty days from the date of the Revising Authority's refusal to make a reference or within thirty days from the date of service of notice of that refusal. (ii) Whether the time taken in obtaining the requisite copies was to be excluded in computing limitation.

Issue (i): Whether an application under Section 11(2)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 had to be filed within thirty days from the date of the Revising Authority's refusal to make a reference or within thirty days from the date of service of notice of that refusal.

Analysis: The expression "within thirty days of such refusal" was held to refer to the date on which the Revising Authority actually refused to make the reference. The wording of the provision was contrasted with the different language used in Section 66 of the Income-tax Act, which expressly made time run from service of notice in one instance. The distinction showed that the legislature had not intended the limitation period under Section 11(2)(b) to begin only on service of notice.

Conclusion: The application had to be filed within thirty days from the date of refusal, not from the date of service of notice.

Issue (ii): Whether the time taken in obtaining the requisite copies was to be excluded in computing limitation.

Analysis: On this question, the Court followed an earlier Division Bench decision which had already determined that the time spent in obtaining the necessary copies could be excluded while computing the limitation period.

Conclusion: The time taken in obtaining the requisite copies was to be excluded.

Final Conclusion: The application was treated as within time and the matter was directed to proceed by issuance of notice to the other side.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a limitation provision uses the words "within thirty days of such refusal", time runs from the date of the refusal itself unless the statute expressly provides that it runs from service of notice.

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