Court-fee valuation for declaratory relief with injunctions: plaintiff's valuation governs jurisdiction, and a revenue assessment is not a decree.

An assessment order made by a Commercial Tax Officer was held not to be a decree, because a decree denotes a final order of a court in a suit and not a revenue authority's quasi-judicial order. The special court-fee provision applicable to suits against decrees therefore did not apply. Where the plaint sought a declaration with consequential injunctions, the suit fell under the provision allowing the plaintiff to value the reliefs, and that valuation also governed jurisdiction. The plaintiff's valuation could be corrected by amendment. The order requiring ad valorem court-fee on a higher valuation was set aside and the plaint was to be revalued on the proper footing.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether an assessment order passed by a Commercial Tax Officer could be treated as a decree for the purpose of court-fee under the special provision; (ii) whether, where declaratory relief is accompanied by consequential injunctions, the suit falls under the provision permitting the plaintiff to value the reliefs and whether that valuation governs jurisdiction as well.

Issue (i): whether an assessment order passed by a Commercial Tax Officer could be treated as a decree for the purpose of court-fee under the special provision.

Analysis: A decree, in the legal sense relevant to the court-fee provision, denotes a final order of a court in a suit. An order made by a revenue authority exercising quasi-judicial powers, but not acting as a court in a suit, does not answer that description. The special provision applicable to suits against decrees therefore did not apply to the assessment order challenged in the plaint.

Conclusion: The assessment order was not a decree, and the higher court-fee provision treating the matter as one attacking a decree was inapplicable.

Issue (ii): whether, where declaratory relief is accompanied by consequential injunctions, the suit falls under the provision permitting the plaintiff to value the reliefs and whether that valuation governs jurisdiction as well.

Analysis: The plaint sought a declaration together with injunctions consequential upon that declaration. Such reliefs fell within the provision allowing the plaintiff to state the value of the relief claimed. Once that provision applied, the plaintiff's valuation for court-fee also determined the jurisdictional value under the valuation statute. The earlier valuation based on a different footing could be corrected by amendment.

Conclusion: The suit was governed by the provision permitting plaintiff's valuation, and that valuation was also the jurisdictional value.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded, the order directing ad valorem court-fee on the higher valuation was set aside, and the plaint was to be revalued on the proper footing.

Ratio Decidendi: An order of a revenue authority is not a decree unless it is a final order of a court in a suit, and where declaratory relief is coupled with consequential injunctions, the plaintiff's valuation under the applicable court-fee provision also governs jurisdiction.

---