1960 (8) TMI 69 - SC - Indian Laws

Court dismisses petition challenging legislative proceedings; upholds privileges and bars re-litigation.

The Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the petitioner had no fundamental right to publish legislative proceedings against the Legislature's ... Privilege of State Legislature to control publication of its proceedings - Fundamental right of free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) - Res judicata - Article 212 - exclusive jurisdiction of the Legislature over its internal proceedings and procedure - Effect of prorogation on pending legislative proceedingsPrivilege of State Legislature to control publication of its proceedings - Fundamental right of free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) - Whether the petitioner's claim of a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) permits reopening of the question decided in the earlier judgment that a State Legislature has the powers and privileges of the House of Commons as at commencement, including control over publication of its proceedings. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the questions raised in the present petition substantially repeat those decided in the earlier proceedings and are governed by the majority decision in the prior writ petition. That decision, binding on the parties, recognised that under Article 194(3) a State Legislature has the same powers, privileges and immunities as the House of Commons at the commencement of the Constitution, which include the power to prohibit publication of proceedings (and a fortiori to control inaccurate reports). The petitioner's contention that Article 19(1)(a) confers an overriding right to publish proceedings was rejected as contrary to the earlier binding decision; the petitioner therefore had no fundamental right in this context that would warrant interference by this Court.The Court refused to reopen the previously decided question and held that the petitioner's Article 19(1)(a) claim does not displace the Legislature's privilege as previously determined.Res judicata - Whether the principle of res judicata bars the petitioner from relitigating substantially the same questions despite reconstitution of the Committee of Privileges. - HELD THAT: - The Court applied the general principles underlying res judicata and held that the earlier full and contested decision binds the parties and the Legislature. Reconstitution of the Committee with different personnel did not change the fact that the same Legislature, by the same Committee acting as an agency of the Assembly, was asserting the same privileges; hence the matter could not be reopened. The correctness of the prior decision was not a matter for reconsideration when applying res judicata.The petition was barred by res judicata and the questions decided earlier could not be reopened.Article 212 - exclusive jurisdiction of the Legislature over its internal proceedings and procedure - Whether the Court should interfere under Article 32 with the internal procedure of the Committee or Assembly on grounds of alleged procedural irregularity. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Article 212 precludes judicial examination of matters that fall within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature to conduct its own business. Allegations of non-compliance with the Legislature's procedural rules amount to irregularity rather than a complete want of jurisdiction; such irregularity is not a ground for intervention by this Court under Article 32. Further, in the present case the Committee's proceedings were not at a stage warranting pre-emptive interference.No relief under Article 32 was granted to challenge alleged procedural irregularities of the Legislature or its Committee.Effect of prorogation on pending legislative proceedings - Whether repeated prorogations between the date of the alleged publication and revival of proceedings extinguished the Legislature's power to proceed. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that prorogation suspends sittings and interrupts business but does not dissolve the House; pending proceedings are suspended and may be revived by a fresh motion. The effect of prorogation is not to permanently 'quash' contempts so as to preclude the Assembly from reviving proceedings on reassembly. Accordingly, prorogation did not bar the Assembly from pursuing the privilege matter when revived.Prorogation did not render the privilege proceedings dead for all time; the Assembly could revive and proceed with them.Final Conclusion: The petition was dismissed: the Court held the earlier decision binding (res judicata), rejected the petitioner's contention that Article 19(1)(a) displaced legislative privilege, declined to interfere with the Legislature's internal procedure under Article 212, and ruled that prorogation did not extinguish the Assembly's power to revive privilege proceedings. Issues Involved:1. Fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) vs. Legislative privileges under Article 194(3).2. Application of res judicata.3. Validity of legislative procedures.4. Timeliness of proceedings for breach of privilege.Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:1. Fundamental Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression vs. Legislative Privileges:The petitioner, a journalist and editor, contended that his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution included the freedom to publish and circulate reports of legislative proceedings. He argued that the Bihar Legislative Assembly's privilege to prohibit the publication of its proceedings contravened this fundamental right. The Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in M. S. M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, holding that under Article 194(3), a State Legislature has the same powers, privileges, and immunities as the House of Commons of the UK at the commencement of the Constitution. This includes the power to prohibit the publication of its proceedings. The majority judgment dismissed the petition, stating that the petitioner had no fundamental right to publish the proceedings of the Bihar Legislature against the Assembly's privilege to control such publications.2. Application of Res Judicata:The respondents argued that the present writ petition was barred by the principle of res judicata, as the issues raised had already been decided in the previous writ petition (No. 122 of 1958). The Court agreed, stating that the principle of res judicata applies to questions that have been raised and decided after full contest, even if the parties or the subject matter are not exactly the same. The Committee of Privileges, despite being reconstituted, was considered the same entity as it was constituted by the same Legislative Assembly. The Court held that the previous decision binds the petitioner and the Legislative Assembly, thereby precluding the re-litigation of the same issues.3. Validity of Legislative Procedures:The petitioner contended that the legislative procedures were not regular and not strictly in accordance with the law. The Court dismissed this contention, citing Article 212 of the Constitution, which precludes judicial interference in the proceedings of the Legislature. The Court emphasized that the Legislature has the jurisdiction to conduct its own business and that procedural irregularities do not warrant judicial intervention under Article 32. The Court also noted that the proceedings were still ongoing, making the contention premature.4. Timeliness of Proceedings for Breach of Privilege:The petitioner argued that the proceedings for breach of privilege, which began in May 1957, had become stale due to multiple prorogations of the Assembly. The Court rejected this argument, clarifying that prorogation suspends but does not dissolve the business of the Assembly. The Assembly remains the same, and pending proceedings can be revived upon reassembly. The Court referenced May's Parliamentary Practice to support its position that prorogation only interrupts proceedings, which can be resumed later.Conclusion:The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner had no fundamental right to publish legislative proceedings against the privileges of the Legislature. The principle of res judicata barred the re-litigation of issues already decided. The Court also upheld the validity of legislative procedures and rejected the argument that the proceedings had become stale due to prorogation. There was no order as to costs.