Civil procedure costs are bounded by statutory limits, and inherent power cannot override the Code's restrictions.

In civil litigation governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, costs remain subject to the statutory scheme in Sections 35 and 35A, so inherent power cannot be used to impose costs beyond those limits. Compensatory costs for vexatious claims and defences are capped under the Code, and the practice of very high costs developed in writ or public law matters cannot be mechanically applied to ordinary civil proceedings. Costs are ordinarily meant to recompense the successful litigant, and directions making them payable to legal services bodies or other non-party organisations should not be routine and must match the court's stated recipient.

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Issues: (i) Whether costs in a civil suit or appeal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 could be enhanced beyond the statutory limits by resort to inherent power. (ii) Whether heavy costs could properly be directed to be paid to the Legal Services Committee or other non-party bodies instead of the successful litigant or the State as directed.

Issue (i): Whether costs in a civil suit or appeal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 could be enhanced beyond the statutory limits by resort to inherent power.

Analysis: Award of costs under Section 35 of the Code is discretionary but remains subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed by law. Compensatory costs for vexatious claims and defences under Section 35A are capped at Rs. 3,000. In civil litigation governed by the Code, the statutory scheme regulates costs, and inherent power cannot be used to bypass the limitations imposed by the provisions dealing with costs. The practice of awarding very high costs is more commonly associated with writ proceedings and public law litigation and cannot be mechanically transplanted into ordinary civil litigation.

Conclusion: The statutory limits under Sections 35 and 35A govern costs in civil litigation, and such limits cannot be overridden by inherent power.

Issue (ii): Whether heavy costs could properly be directed to be paid to the Legal Services Committee or other non-party bodies instead of the successful litigant or the State as directed.

Analysis: Costs are ordinarily intended to recompense the successful litigant for the expense of litigation. Where a court directs costs to be paid to the State, the amount should be directed accordingly, and a statutory legal services body is not the State. The judgment cautions that heavy costs should not be used to create a corpus for legal services authorities or to fund non-party charitable bodies, though token deterrent costs for procedural defaults may be acceptable. A direction inconsistent with the stated recipient of costs is not proper, and such practice should be avoided.

Conclusion: Heavy costs should not be routinely made payable to legal services bodies or other non-party organizations, and the recipient must accord with the court's stated direction.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined to interfere with the costs order in the exercise of discretionary appellate jurisdiction, while clarifying the proper principles governing costs in civil litigation and the impropriety of directing such costs to inappropriate recipients.

Ratio Decidendi: In civil litigation governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, costs remain subject to the statutory scheme in Sections 35 and 35A, and the court should not use inherent power to impose costs contrary to those limitations.

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