Appellate interference with acquittal is limited where the trial court's view is plausible and not perverse.

An appellate court will not reverse an acquittal for alleged contravention of Chapter XX-C and section 276AB of the Income-tax Act unless the trial court's view is perverse or wholly unreasonable. On the evidence relating to a development agreement, the trial court found no punishable transfer attracting the penal provisions invoked. That assessment was treated as a plausible view on the record, and the availability of another possible view did not justify interference. The acquittal was therefore left undisturbed and the challenge failed.

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Issues: Whether the acquittal of the accused for alleged contravention of Chapter XX-C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and section 276AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, arising out of a development agreement, was liable to be reversed in appeal against acquittal.

Analysis: The agreement was examined by the trial court, which concluded on the evidence that it did not disclose a punishable transfer attracting the penal provisions invoked. In an appeal against acquittal, interference is warranted only if the finding is perverse or wholly unreasonable. The view taken by the trial court was a possible view on the record, and the appellate court found no basis to upset that conclusion merely because another view was also possible.

Conclusion: The acquittal was not interfered with and the challenge failed.

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