Issues: Whether unconditional return of a detained yellow metal chain could be directed in writ jurisdiction on the asserted non-issuance of notice within the period under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The statutory safeguards under Sections 110(2) and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 must operate according to the applicable factual and procedural record. Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers discretionary and equitable jurisdiction, which is not ordinarily exercised where there is unexplained delay and laches, suppression of material facts, and disputed questions of fact requiring statutory adjudication. The delayed petition omitted the contemporaneous statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, which recorded non-declaration of the article, acceptance of departmental appraisement, and waiver of written notice and personal hearing. The article's nature as used personal jewellery, its composition, value, baggage treatment, and consequential customs liability remained disputed and required determination through the statutory process. Article 300A of the Constitution of India does not warrant unconditional release while lawful customs proceedings remain to be completed.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to an unconditional writ for return of the article or to annul its detention; appraisement and consequential proceedings are to be completed under the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: Whether NOIDA's time-extension charges for delay in completing the housing projects could be imposed on the successful resolution applicant and homebuyers as Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process costs.

Analysis: The time-extension charges under the lease and the subsequent policy were penal charges intended to deter a defaulting developer and secure timely completion. The developer's default led to insolvency, while the homebuyers funded continuation of construction and the successful resolution applicant was to implement an approved resolution plan. Requiring them to bear charges arising from the corporate debtor's past default would penalise parties not responsible for the delay and defeat the developmental purpose of the lease and completion of the housing projects.

Conclusion: In the peculiar facts, NOIDA's time-extension penalty charges cannot validly be imposed on the successful resolution applicant or homebuyers as Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process costs, including charges claimed beyond three years.

Issues: Whether bail could be granted despite the restrictive bail regime under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, owing to prolonged pre-trial incarceration and the unlikelihood of an early conclusion of trial.

Analysis: Article 21 protects an undertrial against detention becoming punitive merely because of delay in trial. The restrictive rigours governing bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 may be relaxed where continued custody infringes personal liberty. The petitioner had remained incarcerated for over a year, had obtained bail in the scheduled offences, the matter remained at the pre-cognizance stage, and the documentary evidence was already in the Enforcement Directorate's custody, leaving little scope for tampering. The prospect of an early completion of trial was remote.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to conditional bail on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, without any determination on the merits of the money-laundering allegations.

Issues: (i) Whether the service-tax demand under the reverse charge mechanism, founded on the appellant's expense heads and accounting records, was sustainable; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty for suppression with intent to evade were invocable where reverse-charge tax was available as Cenvat credit.

Issue (i): Whether the service-tax demand under the reverse charge mechanism, founded on the appellant's expense heads and accounting records, was sustainable.

Analysis: The expense heads of business promotion, conveyance, legal expenses and freight had been examined, classified and quantified in the appellate order. Comparison of ST-3 returns with the assessee's own balance sheets and Form 26AS was a valid basis for verification. Where the returns did not reconcile with those records and adequate particulars were not furnished despite requisitions, determination on the available material was justified.

Conclusion: The reverse-charge service-tax demand is sustainable against the assessee, but only for the normal limitation period.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty for suppression with intent to evade were invocable where reverse-charge tax was available as Cenvat credit.

Analysis: Tax paid under reverse charge would have been available as Cenvat credit, correspondingly reducing the cash liability under forward charge. This revenue-neutral position negated an intent to evade, which is an essential requirement both for invoking the proviso to Section 73(1) and for imposing penalty under Section 78.

Conclusion: The extended-period demand and the penalty under Section 78 are unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax liability is confined to the normal period with applicable interest, and the liability must be recomputed accordingly; the remaining penalty is retained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where reverse-charge tax is fully available as Cenvat credit to the same taxable person, revenue neutrality negates the intent to evade required for the extended limitation period and the corresponding suppression penalty.

Issues: Whether the withheld IGST refund required an expeditious final administrative decision.

Analysis: The refund had remained pending for over three and a half years. Although one alert against the exporter's IEC was stated to remain pending, the competent authority was directed to take a final decision within one week.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction for a final decision within one week.

Issues: Whether continued detention and prohibition of goods after expiry of the maximum period under Section 67(7) was lawful.

Analysis: The respondents acknowledged that the prohibition order ceased automatically upon expiry of the extended period of six months. Continued detention of the goods pursuant to that expired order was therefore contrary to the statutory limitation.

Conclusion: Continued detention and prohibition of the goods after expiry of the prescribed period was unlawful, and the goods were directed to be released in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether assessments for A.Ys. 2012-13, 2014-15 and 2015-16 were valid without a fresh notice under section 143(2) after the last revised return; (ii) Whether depreciation on the acquired trademark for A.Y. 2012-13 could be restricted; (iii) Whether expenditure for facilitating road access to an existing factory was capital or revenue expenditure; (iv) Whether weighted deduction under section 35(2AB) could be denied or restricted by reference to Forms 3CL for A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2016-17; (v) Whether the foreign-exchange adjustment for A.Y. 2012-13 required verification; (vi) Whether pre-operative interest already offered to tax in an earlier year could be taxed again; (vii) Whether proportionate interest disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) was sustainable; (viii) Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was sustainable for A.Ys. 2012-13, 2015-16 and 2016-17; (ix) Whether the section 14A disallowance could be added to book profit under section 115JB.

Issue (i): Whether assessments for A.Ys. 2012-13, 2014-15 and 2015-16 were valid without a fresh notice under section 143(2) after the last revised return.

Analysis: A valid revised return under section 139(5) substitutes the original return and becomes the operative return for scrutiny. Notice under section 143(2) is a mandatory jurisdictional notice referable to that operative return. In each year, the existing notice preceded the last revised return, the assessment proceeded by taking cognizance of that revised return, and no subsequent notice was issued. Participation in proceedings cannot confer jurisdiction, and section 292BB cures defects in service rather than the complete absence of the requisite notice.

Conclusion: The assessments for A.Ys. 2012-13, 2014-15 and 2015-16 were without jurisdiction and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether depreciation on the acquired trademark for A.Y. 2012-13 could be restricted.

Analysis: The assignment agreement transferred ownership on its effective date; the assignor's limited continued use was expressly as licensee and therefore presupposed the assessee's ownership. Depreciation on the same trademark had been accepted in the preceding year, placing it in the opening block of intangible assets. The half-rate restriction for an asset acquired and put to use for less than 180 days applies only in the first year and cannot be reapplied to opening written-down value.

Conclusion: Restriction of depreciation on the trademark was impermissible and the disallowance was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether expenditure for facilitating road access to an existing factory was capital or revenue expenditure.

Analysis: The payment secured access facilitation for efficient operation of an existing factory without transferring ownership of the road or land, or creating an exclusive, transferable or alienable proprietary right. An enduring operational benefit, without acquisition of an asset or advantage in the capital field, does not convert expenditure into capital expenditure.

Conclusion: The road-access expenditure was revenue expenditure allowable under section 37(1), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether weighted deduction under section 35(2AB) could be denied or restricted by reference to Forms 3CL for A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2016-17.

Analysis: For the relevant pre-amendment periods, annual quantification of eligible expenditure in Form 3CL was not a statutory precondition; the specific quantification requirement was introduced only from 01.07.2016. Recognition of the in-house R&D facility and acceptance of the expenditure at 100% supported the genuineness of the scientific-research activity. However, entitlement to weighted deduction remained dependent upon substantive approval, the statutory agreement, their operative periods, and verification that the expenditure related to the approved facility and excluded non-qualifying items such as land and building. For A.Y. 2016-17, the later Form 3CL quantification could not operate as an absolute ceiling for the pre-amendment previous year, though the disputed balance required item-wise eligibility verification.

Conclusion: Weighted deduction could not be denied merely for want of Form 3CL quantification; the claims were restored for limited verification of substantive eligibility and quantification, in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Issue (v): Whether the foreign-exchange adjustment for A.Y. 2012-13 required verification.

Analysis: The arithmetical reconciliation suggested that the addition exceeded the stated correct adjustment, but complete supporting records and reconciliation had not been furnished before the lower authorities. The asserted computation could not be finally accepted without verification of ledger entries and supporting documents.

Conclusion: The foreign-exchange adjustment was restored for limited factual verification and fresh determination in accordance with law.

Issue (vi): Whether pre-operative interest already offered to tax in an earlier year could be taxed again.

Analysis: The amount appearing in the later project-cost reconciliation formed part of interest already offered as income in the preceding year. Its later accounting treatment did not generate a fresh accrual or permit double taxation.

Conclusion: Deletion of the pre-operative interest addition was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether proportionate interest disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) was sustainable.

Analysis: Identifiable borrowing costs attributable to capital work-in-progress had already been capitalised. In the presence of sufficient interest-free funds, investments or advances may be presumed to have been made from those funds unless a direct nexus with interest-bearing borrowings is established. No such nexus or contrary cash-flow material was shown.

Conclusion: The further proportionate interest disallowance was unsustainable and its deletion was upheld, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (viii): Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was sustainable for A.Ys. 2012-13, 2015-16 and 2016-17.

Analysis: Application of Rule 8D requires account-based satisfaction that the assessee's claim is incorrect and a proximate nexus between expenditure and exempt income. Sufficient own funds supported the presumption that relevant investments were made from non-interest-bearing funds, absent proof of direct use of borrowings. Investments yielding taxable foreign dividend could not be included in the Rule 8D computation. The Finance Act, 2022 Explanation to section 14A, being effective from 01.04.2022, did not govern A.Y. 2016-17.

Conclusion: The section 14A disallowances for the relevant years were unsustainable and their deletions were affirmed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ix): Whether the section 14A disallowance could be added to book profit under section 115JB.

Analysis: Section 115JB is a self-contained computational code. Clause (f) of Explanation 1 permits addition only of expenditure relatable to exempt income that is actually debited to the profit-and-loss account; it does not incorporate the notional section 14A and Rule 8D computation. No additional actually debited expenditure was identified.

Conclusion: The Rule 8D-based additions to book profit under section 115JB were impermissible and their deletions were affirmed, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessments for A.Ys. 2012-13, 2014-15 and 2015-16 stand invalid for want of jurisdictional notice after the revised returns. The remaining weighted-deduction and foreign-exchange matters require the confined factual verification specified, while the revenue challenges to the substantive deletions fail.

Issues: Whether an addition for unexplained money could be sustained under Section 69A on the basis of third-party loose papers, digital entries and statements alleging over-invoicing and cash kickbacks.

Analysis: Section 69A applies only where the assessee is found to be the owner of money or other valuable assets not recorded in its books. No search was conducted upon the assessee, and no cash, asset, bank trail or other evidence established its ownership or receipt of alleged unexplained money. The allegation that the supplier returned cash to the customer was inherently inconsistent with treating that cash as unexplained money owned by the supplier. Third-party diaries and excel entries, without independent corroboration of unaccounted fund flow, could not alone establish the charge. The statements of the customer's officials were also relied upon without affording the assessee cross-examination.

Conclusion: The conditions for invoking Section 69A were not fulfilled; the addition was legally unsustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Mumbai Bench had territorial jurisdiction over an appeal arising from an assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer at Chennai.

Analysis: The ordinary territorial jurisdiction of a Tribunal Bench is determined by the location of the office of the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order, rather than by the location of the assessee or the appellate authority. As the assessment order originated from the Chennai Assessing Officer, the subsequent order of the Mumbai appellate authority did not confer jurisdiction on the Mumbai Bench. The cross-objection, arising from the same assessment proceedings, could likewise not be adjudicated by that Bench.

Conclusion: The Mumbai Bench lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Revenue's appeal and the assessee's cross-objection; the merits of all other issues remain open for the appropriate Bench.

Issues: Whether the difference between the stamp-duty value of land and its agreed purchase consideration was taxable under Section 56(2)(x) where the land was converted from agricultural to non-agricultural use after the agreement to sell and the conversion expenses were borne by the purchaser.

Analysis: Section 56(2)(x) permits adoption of stamp-duty value but creates a rebuttable presumption regarding the property's market value. The agreement pre-dated the introduction of that provision, and the purchaser could not have anticipated the requirement that advance consideration be paid through prescribed banking modes. The record established that the land was agreed to be purchased as agricultural land, its subsequent non-agricultural conversion was undertaken at the purchaser's cost, and the enhanced stamp-duty value resulted from the changed classification rather than any demonstrated market appreciation. The sale consideration remained payable for the original extent of land even though a part was retained by the Government on conversion. There was no evidence of unrecorded consideration or of an increase in market value independent of the purchaser-funded conversion.

Conclusion: The presumption arising from stamp-duty valuation stood rebutted; Section 56(2)(x) was inapplicable and the addition was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimants discharged the reverse burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 in respect of the three foreign-marked gold bars, and whether the appellate findings were perverse; (ii) Whether the presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be invoked in respect of the seized silver bullion; (iii) Whether the seized Indian currency was liable to confiscation as sale proceeds of smuggled goods.

Issue (i): Whether the claimants discharged the reverse burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 in respect of the three foreign-marked gold bars, and whether the appellate findings were perverse.

Analysis: Section 123 places the initial obligation on Revenue to establish seizure of notified goods under the Customs Act on reasonable belief of smuggling; upon satisfaction of those conditions, the burden shifts to the possessor or claimant to prove lawful acquisition. The foreign markings, clandestine concealment, carriers' statements, high purity, contradictory explanations regarding procurement and refining, and absence of documents traceably linked to the specific bars established the requisite reasonable belief. General GST invoices, stock records and business documents, without a direct and credible nexus to the seized bars or an explanation for their foreign markings, did not discharge the reverse burden. The appellate authorities disregarded material evidence and treated production of unconnected invoices as sufficient proof, rendering their findings perverse.

Conclusion: The gold bars were rightly treated as smuggled and liable to confiscation under Section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962; this issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be invoked in respect of the seized silver bullion.

Analysis: The silver was recovered from residential and business premises, bore no foreign markings, was not being clandestinely transported, and was not connected by the carriers' statements to any act of smuggling. A stock discrepancy alone did not establish foreign origin or provide the reasonable belief required before shifting any burden under Section 123. The documentary material supporting the silver was not rebutted by evidence of illicit import.

Conclusion: The statutory burden did not shift in respect of the silver, and its confiscation was unsustainable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the seized Indian currency was liable to confiscation as sale proceeds of smuggled goods.

Analysis: Indian currency is not a notified item under Section 123. Confiscation under Section 121 required cogent evidence linking the cash to sale proceeds of smuggled goods. The cash was not recovered in clandestine circumstances, and no material established such a nexus; suspicion arising from other proceedings could not substitute proof.

Conclusion: The cash was not proved to be sale proceeds of smuggled goods and was not liable to confiscation; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The adjudication concerning confiscation of the gold bars is restored, whereas the relief against confiscation of silver and cash remains intact; the penalties are sustained only to the reduced extent directed.

Ratio Decidendi: The reverse burden under Section 123 arises only upon reasonable belief founded on material indicating smuggling, and it is discharged only by specific, credible and traceable evidence of lawful acquisition of the seized goods.

Issues: Whether a mandamus for release of detained gold could be granted on the alleged non-compliance with Sections 110(2) and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962, where the material record contained the passenger's signed statement and subsequent written acknowledgement of an oral show cause notice.

Analysis: The safeguards under Sections 110(2) and 124 are mandatory, and a mechanical pre-printed waiver alone does not satisfy Section 124. However, the signed contemporaneous statement and subsequent written request recorded non-declaration through the Green Channel, acknowledgement of an oral show cause notice, and a request for adjudication on merits. The allegations of coercion, fabrication of documents, and declaration through the Red Channel conflicted with that record and required evidentiary appreciation. Such disputed questions of fact could not be resolved in Article 226 jurisdiction. The ultimate liability to confiscation or penalty was left to the competent authority.

Conclusion: The petitioner failed to establish an undisputed statutory violation warranting release of the gold in writ jurisdiction; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory revision remedy where the validity of confiscation depends on disputed facts concerning the alleged waiver and oral notice under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: An order of the Commissioner (Appeals) concerning baggage goods is amenable to revision by the Central Government under Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962. Although the existence of an alternative remedy does not absolutely bar jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, exercise of that jurisdiction is discretionary. The alleged statement, the request for dispensing with notice and hearing, the asserted oral show-cause notice, and the later communication involve contested questions concerning their voluntariness, character and legal effect. These questions require examination of the record by the statutory revisional authority. No final opinion was expressed on the legality of confiscation, penalty, or compliance with Section 124.

Conclusion: The statutory revisional remedy is the appropriate forum for determination of the disputed factual and legal questions, which remain open for adjudication in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether properties held by a person not named as an accused in the FIR or ECIR may be provisionally attached as proceeds of crime; (ii) Whether the appellant established that the attached properties were acquired from disclosed or ancestral sources and lacked a nexus with scheduled offences; (iii) Whether a prior order of the Supreme Court required release of the attached properties.

Issue (i): Whether properties held by a person not named as an accused in the FIR or ECIR may be provisionally attached as proceeds of crime.

Analysis: Sections 5 and 8 permit attachment of proceeds of crime in the possession of any person and are not confined to persons accused in the scheduled offence. The statutory object is to trace and freeze proceeds of crime irrespective of the name in which they are held.

Conclusion: Properties held by a non-accused may be provisionally attached where they are found to be proceeds of crime. The issue is decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant established that the attached properties were acquired from disclosed or ancestral sources and lacked a nexus with scheduled offences.

Analysis: The appellant produced no material establishing a legitimate or ancestral source for the properties or any legitimate income capable of explaining their acquisition. In the circumstances, including the predicate criminal activity attributed to the principal accused, the failure to discharge the statutory burden under Section 8(1) supported the finding that the properties represented proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The attached properties were not shown to have been acquired from legitimate sources, and their attachment as proceeds of crime is sustained. The issue is decided against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether a prior order of the Supreme Court required release of the attached properties.

Analysis: The cited order was not shown to direct release of the properties attached under the money-laundering proceedings and had no demonstrated relevance to the confirmation of attachment.

Conclusion: The prior order does not warrant release of the attached properties. The issue is decided against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The confirmation of provisional attachment of the properties as proceeds of crime remains legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 extends to proceeds of crime held by any person, including a person not accused in the scheduled offence, where no legitimate source for the property is established.

Issues: Whether differential central excise duty at the higher rate was payable on SKO intermingled with HSD/MS during pipeline transfer.

Analysis: The settled position applicable to identical interface-SKO clearances was adopted. Intermixing SKO with HSD/MS did not amount to manufacture under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, since the goods were not specified in the Third Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. Further, a departmental circular unsupported by statutory provisions could not impose duty by applying the HSD/MS rate to SKO, and a finding of manufacture could not be sustained where that basis was absent from the show-cause notice.

Conclusion: The higher differential duty demand on intermingled SKO was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the appellant was liable to penalty for abetting clandestine removal of excisable goods under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.

Analysis: The opportunity to examine and cross-examine the persons whose statements were relied upon had been afforded after remand, and the appellant could not claim a breach of natural justice after not availing it. However, the seized diary and notepad established only their recovery, not the truth of their contents. The proceedings against the alleged manufacturer had been set aside, and the Department produced no affirmative evidence of unaccounted manufacture, procurement of raw materials, transport and clearance of goods, identified buyers, or flow of unaccounted consideration. The allegation of clandestine removal consequently lacked tangible corroboration.

Conclusion: The goods allegedly purchased by the appellant were not proved to be liable to confiscation; therefore, penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 was not imposable.

Issues: Whether further time should be granted to pursue the statutory appeal against the tax order.

Outcome: The petitioner was granted 30 days to file the statutory appeal without objection as to limitation; all contentions, including pre-deposit, were kept open.

Issues: Whether receipts and bank transactions of a telecom recharge-voucher distributor operating on commission constitute turnover requiring tax audit and warrant penalty for failure to obtain audit.

Analysis: The assessee acted as a distributor for telecom recharge vouchers and received commission, as supported by tax deduction on commission. Amounts routed through the bank for obtaining vouchers and supplying them to customers were not purchases and sales of the assessee; only the commission accrued from the transactions was its business turnover. The commission income did not exceed the prescribed tax-audit threshold.

Conclusion: The assessee was not required to have its accounts audited, and the penalty for failure to obtain audit was unsustainable. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the appellate authority could set aside and remit an assessment framed under Section 147 read with Section 144C(3) to the Assessing Officer without deciding the assessee's grounds on merits.

Analysis: The assessment was not a best judgment assessment under Section 144. The power under the proviso to Section 251(1)(a) to set aside an assessment and remit it for fresh assessment was therefore inapplicable. The appellate authority was required to adjudicate the grounds raised in appeal on merits by a speaking order, after granting reasonable opportunity to the parties and following Rule 46A where applicable.

Conclusion: The order remitting the matter to the Assessing Officer was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the appellate authority for merit-based adjudication. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.