Strict computation of notice period under cheque dishonour law bars prosecution when notice is issued on the 31st day.

Strict compliance governs the proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act: a statutory notice must be issued within thirty days of receipt of bank intimation of dishonour, and section 9 of the General Clauses Act does not apply where the statutory language does not support that mode of computation. On the facts stated, the notice issued on the 31st day was outside the prescribed period, so prosecution under section 138 could not be sustained. The text also states that a later private settlement did not bar interference with the conviction and sentence, though the amount already received was allowed to be retained toward the admitted civil liability.

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Issues: (i) Whether the statutory notice under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was issued within thirty days of receipt of information of dishonour, and whether section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applied to compute that period. (ii) Whether the subsequent settlement between the parties and the respondent's reliance on it barred interference with the conviction and sentence.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory notice under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was issued within thirty days of receipt of information of dishonour, and whether section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applied to compute that period.

Analysis: The proviso to section 138 prescribes conditions precedent for criminal liability and must be strictly construed. The statutory language requires a notice to be issued within thirty days of receipt of information from the bank, and the words used by Parliament differ from the expression ordinarily attracting section 9 of the General Clauses Act. The notice in this case was issued on the 31st day after receipt of intimation, and therefore fell outside the prescribed period. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act was held inapplicable to extend or alter the computation.

Conclusion: The notice was not issued within the statutory period, so the prosecution under section 138 could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the subsequent settlement between the parties and the respondent's reliance on it barred interference with the conviction and sentence.

Analysis: A private settlement could not override the appellant's entitlement to challenge an order affecting personal liberty, and principles of estoppel or waiver were held inapplicable in the circumstances. The Court also noted that the respondent had not adhered to the settlement. The Court, however, exercised its constitutional power to protect the admitted civil liability by directing that the amount already received need not be refunded.

Conclusion: The settlement did not preclude relief, and interference with the impugned judgment was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were set aside, while the amount already received by the respondent was allowed to be retained in satisfaction of the admitted civil liability.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a penal provision requires notice to be issued within a fixed period of receipt of information, the period must be computed strictly according to the statute, and section 9 of the General Clauses Act does not apply unless the statutory language supports that mode of computation.

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