Restrictive trade practice jurisdiction requires foundational allegations of competition harm; dealer terms on location, targets and pricing were insufficient.

Jurisdiction under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 arises only where the notice and supporting material disclose a restrictive trade practice with the requisite effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition. A bare notice without foundational allegations on competition impact does not satisfy the statutory threshold. Clauses on dealer location, sales targets and resale pricing were examined and found not to establish territorial restriction, tying, or a prohibited resale-price restraint: the location wording did not by itself allocate territory, the sales-target clause reflected performance expectations, and the pricing term permitted sales below the recommended price. On that basis, the alleged practices fell outside the specified provisions.

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Issues: (i) Whether the notice of enquiry was maintainable in the absence of jurisdictional facts showing a restrictive trade practice within the meaning of section 2(o) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969. (ii) Whether the clauses relating to dealer location, sales targets and resale pricing amounted to restrictive trade practices under section 33(1)(b), section 33(1)(f) and section 33(1)(g) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969.

Issue (i): Whether the notice of enquiry was maintainable in the absence of jurisdictional facts showing a restrictive trade practice within the meaning of section 2(o) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969.

Analysis: The expression "restrictive trade practice" requires a trade practice having the effect, actual or probable, of preventing, distorting or restricting competition. A notice and application invoking the Commission's jurisdiction must therefore contain material allegations showing how the complained-of conduct answers that statutory description. On the record, the notice and application did not specifically allege the necessary effect on competition or the statutory ingredients that would confer jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The objection to maintainability on the ground of absence of jurisdictional facts succeeded.

Issue (ii): Whether the clauses relating to dealer location, sales targets and resale pricing amounted to restrictive trade practices under section 33(1)(b), section 33(1)(f) and section 33(1)(g) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969.

Analysis: A mere description of a dealer as being "at" a place did not, by itself, establish an agreement allocating territory or restricting sales outside that place. The sales-target clause was only indicative of performance expectations and did not compel purchase of one product as a condition for purchase of another. The resale pricing clause, read with the dealership terms, expressly permitted sale below the recommended retail price and did not amount to a prohibited resale-price restriction. The statutory ingredients of the alleged clauses were therefore not established.

Conclusion: The alleged practices were not proved to fall within section 33(1)(b), section 33(1)(f) or section 33(1)(g).

Final Conclusion: The Commission's order could not be sustained because the proceeding was not supported by the requisite statutory foundation and the alleged dealership terms did not establish a restrictive trade practice.

Ratio Decidendi: Jurisdiction under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 can be invoked only where the notice and evidence disclose a trade practice satisfying the statutory definition of restrictive trade practice and its effect on competition; absent such foundational allegations and proof, the proceeding is unsustainable.

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