Winding up notice publication without full order was not abuse of process, though costs were imposed for truncated disclosure.

Publication of a notice informing the public about an interim restraint order in a pending winding up petition, without reproducing the full order, was held not to amount by itself to abuse of process warranting dismissal. The court distinguished such notice from premature advertisement of a winding up petition without judicial direction, and accepted that the truncated publication should not have been made. The winding up proceedings were not vitiated, the applications to strike off the petition were dismissed, and costs were imposed on the petitioners.

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Issues: Whether publication of a notice informing the general public about an interim order passed in a winding up petition, before admission of the petition and without reproducing the full order, amounted to abuse of process warranting dismissal of the petition.

Analysis: The publication was challenged as an unauthorized and misleading advertisement of winding up proceedings, said to be contrary to Rule 96 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. The Court noted that the notice was issued to inform the public about the interim restraint order and that the situation was different from cases where a winding up petition itself is prematurely advertised without any court direction. It held that mere publication of a notice about an interim order, even if the order was not fully reproduced, did not by itself constitute abuse of process so as to justify dismissal of the winding up petition. The Court, however, found that the truncated version of the order should not have been published and accepted the apology tendered.

Conclusion: The publication did not amount to abuse of process. The applications to strike off the winding up petition were dismissed, though costs were imposed on the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: A pre-admission notice conveying the existence of an interim order, by itself, did not vitiate the winding up proceedings, but the manner of publication attracted costs.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere publication of a notice informing the public of an interim court order in a pending winding up petition is not, without more, abuse of process warranting dismissal of the petition.

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