Limitation for company offence complaint depends on actual knowledge; filing a balance sheet alone does not start time running.

Limitation for a prosecution under section 628 of the Companies Act is governed by section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with section 469 fixing the start of time from the date of the offence or, where the offence was not known, from the first day it came to the aggrieved person's knowledge. Mere filing of a balance sheet with the Registrar does not by itself establish actual or constructive knowledge of fictitious entries or other latent offences, and a voluminous filing or cursory perusal is insufficient to treat the filing date as the limitation trigger. On the materials, the complaint was not shown to be time-barred and quashing was declined.

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Issues: Whether the criminal complaint was barred by limitation under the Code of Criminal Procedure on the footing that the Registrar must be deemed to have knowledge of the alleged offence when the balance sheet was filed.

Analysis: The period of limitation for the offence alleged under section 628 of the Companies Act is governed by section 468(2)(c) of the Code, and section 469 of the Code fixes the starting point either on the date of the offence or, where the offence was not known to the person aggrieved, on the first day when it came to such person's knowledge. Mere filing of a balance sheet with the Registrar does not automatically amount to actual or constructive knowledge of fictitious entries or other latent offences disclosed on later scrutiny. Receipt of a voluminous document, or even a cursory perusal of it, is insufficient to conclude that the offence was known on that date. The materials did not justify treating the date of filing of the balance sheet as the starting point for limitation.

Conclusion: The complaint was not shown to be barred by limitation, and the request to quash the prosecution failed.

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