2004 (2) TMI 42 - HC - Income Tax

Tax notice quashed after four-year limitation period expired with no material facts disclosure failure alleged

The Bombay HC quashed a notice issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act dated September 23, 2002. The petitioner argued that since no failure to ... Notice under section 148 – petitioner submits that the disclosure of reasons would make it clear that no failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment for that assessment year has been alleged as such the notice is hit by the proviso to section 147 and the same being beyond the period of four years from the end of the assessment year is unsustainable in law much less the same is without jurisdiction. We find that the submission made is well sustainable. -we quash and set aside the notice dated September 23, 2002, issued under section 148 of the Act holding it to be without jurisdiction. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED- Whether the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for reopening the assessment for the assessment year 1997-98 was valid and within jurisdiction.- Whether the Assessing Officer recorded valid reasons justifying reopening the assessment under Section 147, specifically whether there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment.- Whether the expenditure of Rs. 16.07 crores claimed as revenue expenditure by the petitioner in respect of stamp duty paid on amalgamation should be treated as capital expenditure or revenue expenditure.- Whether the proviso to Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, which restricts reopening beyond four years unless there is failure to disclose material facts, applies and if so, whether it was complied with.2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSISValidity and Jurisdiction of Notice under Section 148The legal framework governing reopening of assessments is Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which permits reopening if the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The proviso to Section 147 restricts reopening beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment.Precedents emphasized the necessity of recording reasons that disclose such failure. The Court referred to its earlier decision in a connected writ petition where the notice under Section 148 was quashed for failure to record proper reasons indicating such failure by the assessee.In the present case, the notice was issued on September 23, 2002, for assessment year 1997-98, which is beyond four years. The respondents disclosed reasons recorded prior to issuance of the notice, which were examined. These reasons acknowledged that the petitioner had capitalised Rs. 6.62 crores of stamp duty as capital expenditure and claimed Rs. 16.67 crores as revenue expenditure. The reasons relied on judicial precedents holding that expenditure in connection with amalgamation, including stamp duty, is capital expenditure and that the merger widened the capital base, thus the expenditure should be capitalised. The reasons concluded that treating Rs. 16.67 crores as revenue expenditure was erroneous and resulted in underassessment.However, the Court found that these reasons did not allege any failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. The reasons merely disputed the classification of expenditure, not disclosure. Therefore, the proviso to Section 147 was applicable, and since no failure to disclose was found, the notice was without jurisdiction.The Court applied the principle that reopening beyond four years requires a clear finding of failure to disclose material facts, which was absent here. The Court also noted that the Revenue failed to establish any such lapse or failure by the petitioner.Classification of Stamp Duty Expenditure: Capital or RevenueThe petitioner had paid stamp duty of Rs. 23.29 crores on amalgamation with Brooke Bond Lipton India Ltd. The petitioner apportioned this amount between current assets and fixed assets. Rs. 16.06 crores attributable to current assets was claimed as revenue expenditure, and Rs. 7.22 crores attributable to fixed assets was capitalised.The Assessing Officer accepted the petitioner's claim for the revenue expenditure portion in the original assessment. Subsequently, the reopening notice challenged this classification, relying on judicial precedents:Judgment of Gujarat High Court holding that expenditure in connection with amalgamation is capital expenditure.Supreme Court decision that expenditure incurred for widening capital base is capital expenditure.Calcutta High Court decision treating stamp duty and registration charges in taking over another concern as capital expenditure.The Court noted that these precedents supported the Revenue's contention that the entire stamp duty should be capitalised. However, since the reopening was held to be without jurisdiction, the question of reclassification did not arise for adjudication in this writ petition.Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged the legal principle that such expenditure incurred on amalgamation and widening capital base is capital expenditure, consistent with the cited precedents.Application of Law to Facts and Treatment of Competing ArgumentsThe petitioner argued that the return and accompanying documents fully disclosed the nature and apportionment of the stamp duty expenditure, including a specific note and covering letter explaining the classification. The petitioner also repeatedly requested the reasons recorded to be furnished, which were not provided initially, indicating lack of procedural fairness.The Revenue relied on the legal principle that the expenditure should be capitalised and that the reopening was justified due to underassessment. However, the Court found that the reopening notice did not comply with the statutory requirement of recording reasons that demonstrate failure to disclose material facts, a prerequisite for reopening beyond four years.The Court emphasized that mere disagreement on the classification of expenditure does not amount to failure to disclose material facts. The petitioner had made full disclosure in the return and during assessment proceedings.3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS'Unless the reasons disclose that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment for that assessment year, it is not open for the Assessing Officer to reopen the concluded assessment after the expiry of four years.''In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that treating of the amount of Rs. 16.67 crores of stamp duty as revenue expenditure was erroneous and the same resulted in underassessment of income in the assessment completed under Section 143(3) on February 29, 2000. ... However, the notice is without jurisdiction as the proviso to Section 147 applies and no failure to disclose material facts has been established.'Core principles established include:The proviso to Section 147 of the Income Tax Act mandates that reopening beyond four years is impermissible unless there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment.Recording of reasons for reopening must specifically demonstrate such failure; mere disagreement on tax treatment or classification of expenditure is insufficient.Expenditure incurred in connection with amalgamation, including stamp duty, is generally capital expenditure, especially if it results in widening the capital base.Proper disclosure in the original return and during assessment proceedings protects the assessee against reopening beyond statutory time limits.The Court ultimately quashed and set aside the notice issued under Section 148 as without jurisdiction, holding that the Revenue failed to comply with the statutory requirements and did not establish any failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose material facts. The reopening was therefore invalid.