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Issues: Whether the assessee could correct a clerical error by taking supplementary credit of the correct excise duty amount, and whether the demand for reversal was barred by limitation or could be computed from the date of the appellate order.
Analysis: The credit originally taken was found to have been the sales tax component and not the excise duty component. The subsequent supplementary credit represented only correction of the earlier clerical mistake, which the record showed had not been detected even by the departmental officer who had countersigned the invoice. The rules did not prohibit correction of such mistakes, and the account-maintenance obligation under Rule 226 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 supported accurate rectification rather than reversal. On limitation, the applicable time limits under the Rules and the Act governed demands for reversal of wrongly taken credit, and there was no legal basis to treat the period as running from the date of the appellate order.
Conclusion: The supplementary credit was a permissible correction of clerical error, and the Commissioner (Appeals) was wrong in holding that limitation could be counted from the appellate order. The impugned order was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the demand based on the impugned order could not be sustained in law.
Ratio Decidendi: A wrongly availed credit may be corrected where it reflects a clerical error, and the statutory limitation for reversal or demand must be applied according to the governing provisions and not from the date of an appellate order unless the law so provides.