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Issues: (i) Whether the plaint could be amended to implead and proceed against the third defendant after the statutory bar under section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 ceased to operate. (ii) Whether the amendment was barred by limitation.
Issue (i): Whether the plaint could be amended to implead and proceed against the third defendant after the statutory bar under section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 ceased to operate.
Analysis: The suit had originally been filed with the third defendant already impleaded, though no substantive relief was then claimed against it because proceedings under sections 16 and 17 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 were pending. The statutory protection under section 22 continued until the Board ultimately concluded that the company was not likely to become viable and that winding up was just, equitable and in public interest. Once that protection ended, the plaintiff was entitled to seek amendment so that the suit could proceed against the third defendant and the controversy could be finally adjudicated.
Conclusion: The amendment was permissible and the objection based on section 22 failed, in favour of the petitioner.
Issue (ii): Whether the amendment was barred by limitation.
Analysis: The period during which the statutory restraint operated was treated as capable of exclusion under section 15(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the plaintiff's continued pursuit of earlier relief was also viewed as supporting exclusion on a bona fide basis under section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963. On a prima facie view, the limitation objection was not sufficient to defeat the amendment at that stage.
Conclusion: The amendment was not rejected on limitation grounds, in favour of the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The application for amendment was allowed with costs, and the amended plaint was directed to be taken on record so that the claim against the third defendant could be adjudicated on merits.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory bar preventing proceedings against a defendant ceases, amendment of the plaint may be allowed to proceed against that defendant, and the intervening period may be excluded for limitation purposes if supported by the governing exclusion provisions.