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Issues: (i) Whether, after the establishment of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, a civil court retained jurisdiction to entertain an application under Order 9, Rule 13, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for setting aside an ex parte decree in a bank debt matter exceeding the statutory threshold; (ii) whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal alone could entertain proceedings for recovery of a debt due under a civil court decree and deal with connected post-decree proceedings; (iii) whether the civil court could itself dismiss the application when it had no jurisdiction, instead of returning it for presentation before the Tribunal.
Issue (i): Whether, after the establishment of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, a civil court retained jurisdiction to entertain an application under Order 9, Rule 13, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for setting aside an ex parte decree in a bank debt matter exceeding the statutory threshold.
Analysis: The statutory scheme confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunal in relation to recovery of debts of the prescribed amount and bars civil court jurisdiction except in respect of the Supreme Court and High Court. A debt includes amounts payable under a civil court decree, and the object of the enactment is to provide a complete and speedy recovery mechanism. The application to set aside an ex parte decree was treated as a proceeding connected with recovery of the debt and, therefore, as falling within the Tribunal's exclusive domain once the Tribunal had been established.
Conclusion: The civil court did not retain jurisdiction to entertain the application.
Issue (ii): Whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal alone could entertain proceedings for recovery of a debt due under a civil court decree and deal with connected post-decree proceedings.
Analysis: The Act defines debt broadly enough to include liability under a decree, and section 19 provides a recovery mechanism before the Tribunal. Sections 18 and 31 were read together to hold that once the Tribunal is constituted, even later proceedings arising from a decree for the requisite amount must go before the Tribunal, because permitting parallel proceedings would defeat the legislative scheme and the exclusion of civil court jurisdiction. The overriding effect of the special statute required the civil court forum to give way to the Tribunal.
Conclusion: Such proceedings lay before the Tribunal and not before the civil court.
Issue (iii): Whether the civil court could itself dismiss the application when it had no jurisdiction, instead of returning it for presentation before the Tribunal.
Analysis: Once the civil court found that the dispute fell outside its jurisdiction, it could not proceed to adjudicate the merits and dismiss the application. The proper course was to return the application for presentation before the competent forum, because a court lacking jurisdiction cannot finally determine the matter.
Conclusion: The dismissal order was unsustainable and had to be set aside.
Final Conclusion: The civil court's order was quashed, the application was directed to be returned for presentation before the Tribunal, and the earlier civil court view on jurisdiction was disapproved in favour of the special statutory forum.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a special debt recovery statute confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunal for debts of the prescribed amount and bars civil court jurisdiction, even post-decree proceedings such as an application to set aside an ex parte decree must be pursued before the Tribunal, and a civil court lacking jurisdiction cannot decide the application on merits.