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Issues: (i) Whether a court can grant interim relief under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before commencement of arbitral proceedings and whether a valid arbitration agreement and notice under section 21 are necessary; (ii) whether appointment of a receiver under section 9 is a discretionary equitable remedy that can be granted only on satisfaction of a prima facie case, bona fides, and need for interim protection of the subject-matter; (iii) whether the appellate court should interfere with the refusal to appoint a receiver in the facts of the case.
Issue (i): Whether a court can grant interim relief under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before commencement of arbitral proceedings and whether a valid arbitration agreement and notice under section 21 are necessary;
Analysis: Section 9 confers an independent statutory power on the court to grant interim measures before, during, or after arbitral proceedings, and the provision is wide enough to be invoked even before the arbitration formally commences. The existence of a valid arbitration agreement is essential, and the court's jurisdiction is attracted where the other party has received notice under section 21. The power is not dependent on pending court proceedings and is not subject to restriction by private agreement.
Conclusion: Yes. Section 9 can be invoked before commencement of arbitral proceedings, but only where there is a valid arbitration agreement and the statutory notice requirement is satisfied.
Issue (ii): Whether appointment of a receiver under section 9 is a discretionary equitable remedy that can be granted only on satisfaction of a prima facie case, bona fides, and need for interim protection of the subject-matter;
Analysis: Appointment of a receiver is a harsh and exceptional measure. Relief under section 9 is an interim measure of protection, not a device for adjudicating the merits of the dispute. The court must be satisfied about a prima facie case, bona fides, balance of convenience, and the necessity to protect the property or business from loss, waste, or imminent harm. In a going concern, a receiver should be appointed only with caution and only when compelling circumstances are shown.
Conclusion: Yes. Receiver appointment under section 9 is discretionary and equitable, and it can be ordered only in a fit case on the required factual satisfaction.
Issue (iii): Whether the appellate court should interfere with the refusal to appoint a receiver in the facts of the case;
Analysis: The record did not establish that the business was in imminent peril, that the continued management of the firm would destroy or waste its assets, or that the applicant approached the court with sufficient bona fides. The court of first instance had exercised its discretion on relevant considerations, and appellate interference with such discretionary refusal is warranted only where the discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse.
Conclusion: No. The refusal to appoint a receiver did not call for appellate interference.
Final Conclusion: The judgment affirms the limited and discretionary nature of interim relief under section 9, and upholds the refusal to appoint a receiver in the absence of a strong prima facie case and bona fide necessity for protection of the business.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is an independent source of judicial power to grant interim protection, but a receiver may be appointed only in exceptional circumstances where the applicant shows a prima facie case, bona fide conduct, and real necessity to preserve the subject-matter from imminent harm.