Transporter penalty requires proof of knowledge; mere probability is insufficient to sustain a quasi-judicial penalty.

Penalty on a transporter cannot be sustained on a mere presumption that he knew the goods were contraband; such knowledge must be proved by evidence in quasi-judicial proceedings. Where the Revenue relies only on probability and places no material on record to establish awareness of the offending nature of the goods, penalty is not justified and the order setting it aside stands upheld.

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Issues: Whether penalty on the transporter could be sustained in the absence of evidence showing knowledge of the contraband nature of the goods, or could be imposed merely on probabilities.

Analysis: The Revenue supported the penalty only on the basis of a presumed likelihood that the transporter knew about the offending goods. The Tribunal found that no evidence had been placed on record to establish such knowledge. In quasi-judicial proceedings, penalty cannot be imposed on a mere theory of probability where the alleged offender's knowledge is not proved by evidence.

Conclusion: The penalty was not justified and the order setting it aside was upheld.

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