Issues: (i) Whether dates appearing in Forms GST DRC-01 and GST DRC-07 govern limitation for issuance of show cause notices and adjudication orders under Sections 74(2) and 74(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether challenges to the invocation of Section 74 and the evidentiary basis of the demand should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite an available statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Whether dates appearing in Forms GST DRC-01 and GST DRC-07 govern limitation for issuance of show cause notices and adjudication orders under Sections 74(2) and 74(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 74(2) requires issuance of the substantive notice under Section 74(1), while Section 74(10) requires issuance of the substantive order under Section 74(9) within the stipulated periods. Rule 142(1)(a) treats Form GST DRC-01 as an electronic summary accompanying the notice, and Rule 142(5) treats Form GST DRC-07 as an electronic summary of the order. The substantive notices and orders bore dates preceding the asserted limitation cut-off dates; the later dates on the electronic summaries could not replace or alter the dates of the substantive instruments.

Conclusion: Forms GST DRC-01 and GST DRC-07 do not determine limitation under Sections 74(2) and 74(10), and their later dates do not render the substantive notices or orders time-barred.

Issue (ii): Whether challenges to the invocation of Section 74 and the evidentiary basis of the demand should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite an available statutory appeal.

Analysis: The objections concerning fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression, knowledge or collusion, admissibility of input tax credit, computation, penalty, and sufficiency of departmental material require factual examination and appreciation of evidence. Section 107 provides an efficacious appellate remedy competent to address those questions of law and fact. No denial of hearing or patent jurisdictional defect was established, and the limitation objection did not justify bypassing that remedy.

Conclusion: The merits challenges are not to be entertained in writ jurisdiction and may be urged before the statutory Appellate Authority under Section 107.

Final Conclusion: Timely substantive notices and adjudication orders are not invalidated by subsequent electronic summaries, and factual challenges to the demand must be pursued through the statutory appellate mechanism.

Ratio Decidendi: For limitation under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the relevant dates are those of the substantive show cause notice and adjudication order; Forms GST DRC-01 and GST DRC-07 are consequential electronic summaries and do not substitute those instruments.

Issues: (i) Whether the computer printouts and private or third-party records were admissible and sufficiently linked to the assessee to establish clandestine manufacture and under-invoicing; (ii) Whether abnormal electricity consumption and alleged theft of electricity established unaccounted manufacture and clearance; (iii) Whether the alleged clandestine production was sustainable in view of the installed furnace capacity; (iv) Whether statements relied upon for the demand could be admitted without compliance with the prescribed procedure.

Issue (i): Whether the computer printouts and private or third-party records were admissible and sufficiently linked to the assessee to establish clandestine manufacture and under-invoicing.

Analysis: Electronic records require compliance with the safeguards under Section 36B, including the prescribed certification concerning their production and device. The separately captioned computer folder, records not bearing the assessee's name, and documents recovered from dealer premises lacked independent verification linking the transactions to the assessee. There was also no tangible corroboration through raw-material consumption, transport, buyers, financial flow-back, or actual excess production.

Conclusion: The computer printouts and private or third-party records were inadmissible or insufficient to establish clandestine manufacture or under-invoicing, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether abnormal electricity consumption and alleged theft of electricity established unaccounted manufacture and clearance.

Analysis: Electricity consumption may vary because of operational and technical factors. Without a scientifically established plant-specific consumption norm and independent evidence linking consumption to quantified unaccounted production and clearance, electricity data and an allegation of electricity theft could not substantiate excise evasion.

Conclusion: Abnormal electricity consumption and alleged theft of electricity did not establish unaccounted manufacture or clearance, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged clandestine production was sustainable in view of the installed furnace capacity.

Analysis: A charge of clandestine manufacture must be tested against the physical capacity of the plant. The alleged production was not shown to be achievable even with both operational furnaces, and no undisclosed manufacturing facility was established.

Conclusion: The alleged clandestine production was not sustainable in view of the unaddressed capacity constraint, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether statements relied upon for the demand could be admitted without compliance with the prescribed procedure.

Analysis: Statements recorded during investigation cannot prove the truth of their contents unless the mandatory procedure under Section 9D is followed. The required statutory exercise was not undertaken, and the statements had not been tested in the prescribed manner.

Conclusion: The untested statements could not be read in evidence against the assessee, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The cumulative absence of admissible electronic evidence, independently corroborated material, capacity-based proof, and legally usable statements left no sustainable evidentiary basis for excise liability, interest, or penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A charge of clandestine manufacture, clearance, or under-invoicing cannot rest on uncertified electronic records, unverified private or third-party documents, untested statements, or electricity consumption alone; it requires legally admissible and independently corroborated evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether verification of the conveyance contravened Rule 138B of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017; (ii) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether verification of the conveyance contravened Rule 138B of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Rule 138B permits physical verification by a proper officer authorised by the Commissioner or an empowered officer. The record established that the physical verification was undertaken by an authorised proper officer. Following the earlier remand, a fresh notice was issued, relevant materials were supplied, an opportunity of personal hearing was given, and the reply was considered before the confiscation order was made.

Conclusion: The verification did not contravene Rule 138B, and no jurisdictional defect or breach of natural justice was established.

Issue (ii): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not absolutely bar writ jurisdiction, but its exercise requires exceptional circumstances, including breach of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, excess of jurisdiction, or a challenge to the validity of legislation. None of those circumstances was established. The grievance regarding supply of relied-upon documents and the assessment of the adjudicatory record required factual examination within the appellate framework.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction was declined, and the petitioner was required to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the confiscation adjudication remains amenable to examination by the competent appellate authority under the statutory scheme.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a GST adjudication follows notice and opportunity of hearing and no exceptional ground for writ intervention is established, factual or procedural grievances must be pursued through the statutory appellate remedy rather than under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: Whether an erroneously entered respondent on the Tribunal portal may be corrected after registration of the appeal.

Analysis: Rule 26 of the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025 permits rectification of clerical and similar errors, while Rule 32(1) permits amendment of a defective appeal form upon sufficient cause. The record showed that the respondent was incorrectly selected on the portal although the proper State tax authority was identified in the original appeal memorandum and the impugned order. The erroneous portal entry was a curable and non-fatal procedural defect, and the proper respondent required service. As the portal did not provide a post-registration correction mechanism, re-upload of the corrected appeal documents and Registry action for portal correction were required.

Conclusion: Substitution of the correctly described respondent was permitted, with consequential correction of the portal record.

Issues: Whether a departmental GST appeal involving disputed tax below the prescribed monetary limit could be admitted without the Revenue pleading and proving a recognised exception.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits litigation-control instructions regulating departmental appeals. The applicable circulars fixed a monetary threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 for appeals before GSTAT, subject to specified exceptions. The disputed tax of Rs. 7,36,272 was below that threshold. Authorisation under Section 112(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was distinct from compliance with the monetary-limit policy. The Revenue was required to identify and substantiate a specified exception or produce a case-specific recorded opinion of the Commissioner under the residual exception. No such material was produced.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not maintainable for admission and could not proceed to adjudication on merits.

Issues: Whether use of the consignee's former address in two tax invoices and corresponding e-way bills, despite an otherwise documented movement of goods, justified imposition of a transit penalty under Section 129.

Analysis: Section 129 permits a transit penalty only where the established contravention attracts that provision. Invoice and transit-document requirements under Section 31, Rule 46, Section 68 and Rules 138 and 138A remain mandatory; however, strict civil liability does not dispense with proof of a breach warranting the particular penalty. The applicable legal approach requires an assessment whether a documentary address discrepancy is technical and bona fide or evidences an intent to evade tax. Section 126(6) does not authorise reduction of a valid percentage-based penalty under Section 129; applicability of Section 129 must first be established.

Analysis: The goods were accompanied by invoices, e-way bills and bilty documents, and physical verification confirmed their description, quantity and quality. The purchaser was identified, and the former address was supported by its historical connection with the purchaser and retention of outdated customer data. No different purchaser, fictitious transaction, diversion, clandestine unloading, repeated use of documents, or suppression of value was established. The address mismatch alone, in those circumstances, did not establish a substantive transit violation. Proportionality supported distinguishing the explained documentary error from conduct concealing a taxable movement.

Conclusion: The explained use of the former consignee address did not attract Section 129, and the disputed transit penalty was unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the initial intra-State movement from the consignor's place of business to the transporter's place of business for onward transport qualified under the third proviso to Rule 138(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, such that leaving Part B unfilled did not contravene the Rules or attract penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether mens rea is an essential requirement for a penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the initial intra-State movement from the consignor's place of business to the transporter's place of business for onward transport qualified under the third proviso to Rule 138(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, such that leaving Part B unfilled did not contravene the Rules or attract penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Rule 138 generally requires conveyance details in Part B, but its third proviso creates an express statutory exception for movement, within the same State and up to 50 km, from the consignor's place of business to the transporter's place of business for further transportation. Explanation 2 preserves that exception. Section 129 applies only where goods move in contravention of the Act or Rules. The recorded movement was from the consignor's depot to the transporter's warehouse within Uttar Pradesh, over a distance below 30 km, for consolidation before onward dispatch. The final consignee's location did not alter the character of this initial journey.

Conclusion: The movement fell within the third proviso to Rule 138(3); leaving Part B unfilled was permitted and did not constitute a contravention attracting penalty under Section 129. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether mens rea is an essential requirement for a penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Mens rea may be material where the statutory scheme makes intention, fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression relevant, but Section 129 does not expressly make an intent to evade tax an indispensable element. A strict civil penalty may therefore follow upon proof of an actual contravention. Section 126 does not supply a general power to reduce or waive the fixed percentage penalty under Section 129. However, the threshold requirement remains an established breach of the Act or Rules; a statutory exception cannot be disregarded to create such a breach.

Conclusion: Mens rea is not invariably required for a penalty under Section 129, but no penalty can arise without an actual contravention. As the omission was expressly permitted, absence of mens rea was not determinative and the penalty could not be sustained. This issue operates in favour of the assessee in the present case.

Final Conclusion: The express exception governing the initial stage of transportation precluded treating the unfilled Part B as a statutory violation, leaving the imposed fiscal liability without legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under Section 129 cannot be imposed where the third proviso to Rule 138(3) permits conveyance details in Part B to remain unfilled during the qualifying initial intra-State movement from the consignor's premises to the transporter's premises for further transportation.

Issues: (i) Whether goodwill arising on amalgamation is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the Revenue could, for the first time before the High Court, invoke the restriction under the fifth proviso to Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether goodwill arising on amalgamation is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Explanation 3(b) to Section 32(1) treats goodwill as an asset for depreciation purposes. The question stood settled by the binding determination that goodwill is an asset within that Explanation and is eligible for depreciation.

Conclusion: Goodwill is a depreciable intangible asset and depreciation thereon is allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Revenue could, for the first time before the High Court, invoke the restriction under the fifth proviso to Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The proposed restriction had neither been specifically raised before nor decided by the appellate authorities. It did not constitute an independent substantial question of law arising from the Tribunal's order.

Conclusion: The Revenue cannot raise the fifth-proviso restriction for the first time before the High Court; no substantial question of law arises on that basis, against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's entitlement to depreciation on goodwill remains undisturbed, and the unraised statutory restriction cannot be introduced at the appellate stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Goodwill falls within the statutory category of depreciable assets, and a new issue not raised or adjudicated before the lower appellate authorities cannot be made the basis of a substantial question of law.

Issues: Whether the writ challenge to the NCLT's observations could be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The NCLT's observations proceeded on the settled position that claims relating to the period preceding approval of a resolution plan stand extinguished. Those observations fell within the NCLT's jurisdiction under the insolvency framework. The asserted conflict with State tax legislation did not establish a jurisdictional error, as permitting State tax claims to bypass the corporate insolvency resolution process would undermine the statutory effect of an approved resolution plan.

Conclusion: No jurisdictional infirmity was established to bypass the statutory appellate remedy before the NCLAT.

Issues: (i) Whether the employees' dismissals without an inquiry violated the principles of natural justice and were illegal; (ii) Whether approval of a corporate insolvency resolution plan extinguished the employees' rights under pre-CIRP labour awards and barred withdrawal of the court deposits.

Issue (i): Whether the employees' dismissals without an inquiry violated the principles of natural justice and were illegal.

Analysis: The employees were dismissed through composite charge-sheet-cum-dismissal orders after they had reported at their transferred locations, without a disciplinary inquiry. The employer did not establish any perversity in the labour awards finding that the dismissals had been effected in gross breach of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The terminations were illegal, and the finding in the labour awards was affirmed in favour of the employees.

Issue (ii): Whether approval of a corporate insolvency resolution plan extinguished the employees' rights under pre-CIRP labour awards and barred withdrawal of the court deposits.

Analysis: The labour awards had adjudicated the employees' claims and granted compensation before commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process. Their entitlement under the awards had therefore crystallised before the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and approval of the resolution plan. This was distinguishable from an unadjudicated employment claim pending when the resolution plan was approved. The deposits were made to secure compensation awarded to the employees during the challenge proceedings; their continued deposit in court did not, by itself, entitle the new management to recover them. The general question whether court deposits constitute assets of the corporate debtor was not decided.

Conclusion: The resolution plan did not defeat the employees' crystallised entitlement under the labour awards. The employees were entitled to withdraw the deposited amounts with accrued interest as compensation, in full settlement of their service-related claims.

Final Conclusion: The labour awards remain operative, and the court deposits with accrued interest are to satisfy the compensation payable to the employees, with no further service-related benefits remaining payable.

Issues: (i) Whether scrutiny under Section 39(1) could be initiated against a continuously registered dealer without a valid notice under Section 35; (ii) Whether the five-year limitation in Section 57 applied to Section 39 scrutiny; (iii) Whether the Superintendent of Taxes had lawful delegated authority to commence Section 39 proceedings; and (iv) Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the alternative remedy under Section 65.

Issue (i): Whether scrutiny under Section 39(1) could be initiated against a continuously registered dealer without a valid notice under Section 35.

Analysis: Section 35(2) mandates registered dealers to file returns, whereas Section 35(3) permits notice to dealers other than registered dealers. Section 39(1) confines scrutiny to returns furnished by a registered dealer to whom a notice under Section 35 has been issued. The notice requirement is a condition precedent to the exercise of scrutiny jurisdiction. A harmonious construction did not permit the statutory qualification to be disregarded; a dealer that was always registered and filed returns under Section 35(2) could not be subjected to Section 39 scrutiny without the prescribed notice.

Conclusion: The Section 39(1) scrutiny was without jurisdiction for want of the mandatory Section 35 notice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the five-year limitation in Section 57 applied to Section 39 scrutiny.

Analysis: The statutory limitation governing completion of assessments could not be circumvented through recourse to the scrutiny mechanism under Section 39. Section 57 was applied to Section 39 proceedings, and scrutiny commenced in 2023 for returns relating to 2007 to 2017 fell beyond the prescribed period.

Conclusion: The impugned Section 39 scrutiny proceedings were barred by statutory limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Superintendent of Taxes had lawful delegated authority to commence Section 39 proceedings.

Analysis: Section 26 read with Rule 3 requires delegation of the Commissioner's powers through notification in the Official Gazette. No gazette notification delegating Section 39 powers to the Superintendent of Taxes was produced. Internal orders or circulars could not satisfy the mandatory statutory requirement for delegation.

Conclusion: The Superintendent of Taxes lacked lawful delegated authority to initiate the Section 39 proceedings, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the alternative remedy under Section 65.

Analysis: The challenge disclosed a jurisdictional error arising from non-fulfilment of the statutory notice requirement and absence of valid delegation. This brought the matter within the recognised exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of an alternative remedy.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the alternative remedy, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme did not permit scrutiny against the assessee without fulfilment of the express jurisdictional preconditions, compliance with limitation, and lawful delegation of power.

Ratio Decidendi: A fiscal scrutiny power conditioned by statute may be exercised only upon strict compliance with its express jurisdictional preconditions, prescribed limitation, and lawful delegation.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 155, of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional or must be read down to confine ITC reversal to fraudulent, collusive, or non-genuine transactions; (ii) Whether and subject to what safeguards a purchaser's ITC may be denied or reversed when the supplier defaults in depositing tax or its registration is subsequently cancelled.

Issue (i): Whether Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 155, of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional or must be read down to confine ITC reversal to fraudulent, collusive, or non-genuine transactions.

Analysis: Input tax credit is a statutory concession, and actual payment of tax to the Government is integral to the credit mechanism. Section 16(2)(c) operates subject to Section 41 and forms part of an integrated statutory framework governing eligibility, reversal, recovery from the supplier, and subsequent re-availment. The earlier matching and reconciliation framework under Sections 42 and 43 was not operationalised, but the resulting difficulty concerns the manner of enforcement rather than the constitutional validity of the condition itself.

Analysis: The possibility of arbitrary or mechanical action in individual cases does not invalidate Section 16(2)(c). The condition cannot be restricted only to fraud, collusion, or fictitious transactions by reading down its text; instead, it must be applied harmoniously with the statutory safeguards and recovery mechanisms available against the defaulting supplier.

Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 155, is constitutionally valid and is not read down to limit its operation exclusively to fraudulent, collusive, or non-genuine transactions.

Issue (ii): Whether and subject to what safeguards a purchaser's ITC may be denied or reversed when the supplier defaults in depositing tax or its registration is subsequently cancelled.

Analysis: The non-operationalisation of the original matching mechanism, the phased substitution of Section 41, and the subsequent introduction of Rule 37A require the statutory regime applicable to the relevant tax period to be applied. For periods before Rule 37A, the absence of a re-availment mechanism is material. The statutory power to recover tax collected but not deposited by the supplier, including under Section 76, remains a relevant part of the scheme and cannot be rendered ineffective.

Analysis: Subsequent or retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration, a nil or short tax declaration, or an alert concerning the supplier may justify an inquiry but cannot alone justify denial or reversal of ITC. The notice must disclose the relevant supplier, invoices, tax periods, nature of the default, material relied upon, and the status of recovery proceedings against the supplier. The purchaser may discharge the burden of proof through invoices and evidence of actual receipt and movement of goods or services. A notice invoking fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression must itself state the foundational facts connecting the purchaser to such conduct. Personal hearing, reasoned consideration of the purchaser's material, and examination of the grounds for retrospective cancellation are required.

Conclusion: ITC cannot be denied or reversed mechanically merely because the supplier defaulted or its registration was subsequently cancelled. Reversal may follow where the purchaser fails to establish eligibility or where fraud, collusion, non-receipt of goods or services, or other grounds rendering the credit inadmissible are established in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: Pending notices and completed adjudications must be dealt with afresh in conformity with the prescribed safeguards, after adequate opportunity to furnish material and be heard. Amounts already reversed, deposited, or recovered shall be adjusted or refunded as warranted by the fresh determination, and no fresh coercive recovery may be undertaken until that determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Actual payment of tax is a valid statutory condition for input tax credit, but Section 16(2)(c) must be enforced as part of the integrated GST scheme and cannot be used to impose mechanical reversal upon a bona fide purchaser without a fact-based inquiry, procedural fairness, and consideration of recovery from the defaulting supplier.

Issues: Whether the reassessment order under Section 148A(3) and the consequent notice under Section 148 for assessment year 2020-21 warranted writ interference where the materially identical reassessment challenge for the preceding assessment year had already been decided against the assessee.

Analysis: The information and allegations underlying the impugned reassessment action were identical to those involved in the preceding assessment year. The earlier decision had found that determining whether the amount disclosed by the assessee arose from a spurious transaction resulting in escaped income required factual examination by the Assessing Officer. Judicial discipline required adherence to the coordinate bench decision rendered in the assessee's own case.

Conclusion: The reassessment order and consequential notice did not warrant writ interference; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax paid under a mistake of law on exempt goods transport agency services is refundable; (ii) Whether interest is payable on that amount and, if so, at what rate.

Issue (i): Whether service tax paid under a mistake of law on exempt goods transport agency services is refundable.

Analysis: The assessee was eligible for exemption under Clause (21)(d) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST, as amended, but paid service tax under reverse charge despite no liability. Such payment, made under a mistake of law, is a revenue deposit rather than tax or duty. Consequently, Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 does not govern the refund claim, and retention of the amount would be without authority of law under Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The refund of the amount paid under mistake of law is admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest is payable on that amount and, if so, at what rate.

Analysis: Since the payment retains the character of a revenue deposit and is outside the statutory refund mechanism for duty, the interest regime under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is inapplicable. The applicable principle supports compensatory interest at 12% per annum for wrongful retention of the deposit.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest at 12% per annum from the respective dates of deposit until payment of the refund, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption is given full effect by treating the erroneous payment as a refundable revenue deposit, with compensation for its retention.

Ratio Decidendi: A payment made under a mistake of law where no tax liability exists is a revenue deposit outside Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and its unlawful retention warrants refund with compensatory interest.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner could withhold the refund under Section 54(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 when an anti-evasion investigation concerning alleged fraudulent input tax credit was pending.

Analysis: Section 54(11) permits withholding where the refund-generating order is subject to an appeal, further proceedings, or any other pending proceeding under the Act, and the Commissioner, after hearing the taxable person, forms an opinion that release would adversely affect revenue because of fraud or malfeasance. The expression concerning other pending proceedings extends beyond a formally instituted appeal and includes a pending statutory investigation. The anti-evasion investigation had commenced before the refund-withholding order and was supported by contemporaneous material indicating non-existent or cancelled suppliers, absence of established movement of goods, and absence of the claimant from the manufacturer's supply chain. Those circumstances bore directly on actual receipt of goods for input tax credit purposes and supported the requisite opinion of fraud or malfeasance. A subsequently issued show-cause notice merely crystallised the ongoing investigation; the absence of a pending appellate proceeding or separate judicial stay did not invalidate the statutory withholding.

Conclusion: The refund was validly withheld under Section 54(11); the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be exercised to quash an input-tax-credit adjudication order despite an available statutory appeal, on the asserted bar under Section 6(2)(b), variance from the show-cause notice, and denial of an effective hearing.

Analysis: Article 226 jurisdiction does not ordinarily substitute the statutory appellate process where the challenge requires examination of the adjudication record and disputed facts. The bar under Section 6(2)(b) depends upon identity of the precise subject matter, including the relevant tax period, transactions, invoices, ITC liability and allegations; a common supplier or general connection with ITC is insufficient. Whether the State and Central proceedings concerned identical liabilities required examination of their respective notices, orders and transaction-wise material. The impugned order disclosed an independent finding of ITC availment on goods-less invoices with reference to Section 16(2)(b), and therefore did not facially rest on a wholly new basis. The recorded grant of hearing opportunities, notwithstanding an apparent date discrepancy, and objections regarding evidence, limitation, clubbing of periods, replies and invocation of Section 74 required scrutiny of the underlying record in appeal.

Conclusion: An efficacious appellate remedy was required to be pursued because no ex facie lack of jurisdiction or undisputed breach of natural justice was established; all objections, including the applicability of Section 6(2)(b), remained open for appellate determination.

Issues: (i) Whether GST dues for Financial Year 2021-22, including related interest and penalty, which were not lodged in the CIRP, stood extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan, rendering subsequent proceedings without jurisdiction; and (ii) Whether the availability of a statutory appeal precluded exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether GST dues for Financial Year 2021-22, including related interest and penalty, which were not lodged in the CIRP, stood extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan, rendering subsequent proceedings without jurisdiction.

Analysis: Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 binds governmental authorities to an approved resolution plan, while Section 238 gives the Code overriding effect. Statutory claims relating to a pre-effective-date period that were not submitted during the CIRP are extinguished on approval of the plan. The approved plan expressly extinguished pre-effective-date governmental claims, whether assessed or unassessed, known or unknown. The distinction between tax adjudication and recovery was unavailable because initiation and continuation of proceedings under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 in respect of an extinguished claim are themselves barred. Section 88 of that Act concerns liquidation and could not revive an extinguished liability; its general adjudicatory provisions also yield to the Code. The departmental circular and instruction recognised that unfiled or belated claims are extinguished on approval of the resolution plan.

Conclusion: The GST dues, interest and penalty for the relevant period stood extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan, and the revenue authorities lacked jurisdiction to initiate or continue proceedings concerning them. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the availability of a statutory appeal precluded exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: A statutory appellate remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where the authority has acted without jurisdiction or contrary to binding law. The admitted facts raised a pure legal question concerning the power to initiate proceedings after extinction of the claim under the approved resolution plan.

Conclusion: The statutory appellate remedy did not preclude writ jurisdiction. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Statutory tax claims omitted from the CIRP cannot be revived through post-resolution-plan adjudication, including demands of related interest and penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: An approved resolution plan extinguishes statutory tax claims not submitted in the CIRP, and the overriding effect of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prevents revenue authorities from initiating or continuing proceedings to determine or recover such claims.

Issues: Whether a timeframe for deciding applications for cancellation of duplicate Permanent Account Numbers should be prescribed.

Analysis: The grievance concerned the absence of a prescribed period for disposal of duplicate PAN cancellation applications and the resulting difficulties in accessing PAN-linked services. Since no representation seeking prescription of such timeframe had first been made to the CBDT, the matter was considered appropriate for consideration by that authority.

Outcome: The petitioner was granted liberty to submit a representation to the CBDT within two weeks, and the CBDT was directed to decide it within eight weeks of receipt and communicate its decision.