Limitation for winding-up on decree debt does not extend beyond enforcement period; petition held time-barred.

A winding-up petition based on a decree debt was held time-barred where the underlying supply claim arose in 1992, suit proceedings ended in a 1997 decree, and winding-up was invoked only in 2001. The Court ruled that a decree does not extend limitation for enforcement and cannot be used as a substitute for execution after the prescribed period has expired. It applied the residuary limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, counting time from the accrual of the cause of action, or at the latest from the date of the decree. The petition was therefore not maintainable.

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Issues: Whether a winding-up petition founded on a decree debt, where the original cause of action arose in 1992 and the decree was obtained in 1997, was barred by limitation and therefore not maintainable.

Analysis: The debt originated from supply transactions in 1992, suit proceedings were taken in 1994, and a decree was obtained in 1997. The petitioning creditor invoked the winding-up jurisdiction only in 2001. The Court held that, even if the original claim merged in the decree, the creditor could not use winding-up as a substitute for execution after the expiry of the limitation period. It distinguished authorities where winding-up was sought within time and accepted the principle that a creditor's decree does not extend limitation beyond the period prescribed for enforcement. The Court further held that the applicable period was the residuary limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and that the period had to be counted from the accrual of the cause of action, or at the latest from the date of the decree.

Conclusion: The winding-up petition was barred by limitation and was not maintainable.

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