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Issues: (i) whether the appellant was bound by the consent order and the affidavit of undertaking executed on its behalf, notwithstanding its claim that it was a third party, that the signatory lacked authority, and that the undertaking was given under a mistake of fact; (ii) whether the consent order and undertaking required compulsory registration or were exempt from registration; and (iii) whether the decree could be enforced against the appellant's property in execution.
Issue (i): Whether the appellant was bound by the consent order and the affidavit of undertaking executed on its behalf, notwithstanding its claim that it was a third party, that the signatory lacked authority, and that the undertaking was given under a mistake of fact.
Analysis: The consent order was passed on the basis of representations and undertakings made before the Special Court and the appellant's property was specifically brought within the arrangement by the undertaking filed by the Chairman. The Court held that the parties, having secured the benefit of the compromise and having represented the facts to the Special Court, could not later disown the consequences by invoking technical objections. The challenge based on lack of authority and alleged mistake of fact was rejected as an afterthought and as inconsistent with the conduct of the directors who had allowed the Chairman to act on the company's behalf.
Conclusion: The appellant was held bound by the consent order and the affidavit of undertaking, and its objections on the grounds of third-party status, want of authority, and mistake of fact were rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether the consent order and undertaking required compulsory registration or were exempt from registration.
Analysis: The Court held that the consent order and the undertaking did not themselves create, declare, assign, limit, or extinguish any right, title, or interest in immovable property. Their object was only to secure the property and enable execution in the event of default by the judgment-debtor. Such an arrangement fell within the exempted category of a decree or order of court and did not attract the compulsory registration requirement under section 17(1)(b). The plea that want of registration rendered the arrangement unenforceable was therefore rejected.
Conclusion: The consent order and undertaking were held not to require compulsory registration and were treated as exempt from the registration requirement.
Issue (iii): Whether the decree could be enforced against the appellant's property in execution.
Analysis: The Court held that the undertaking given to the Court, read with the consent decree, authorised execution against the appellant's property if the decree remained unsatisfied. Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure also supported enforcement of the undertaking. The appellant's property could therefore be proceeded against in execution when the contingency contemplated by the undertaking arose.
Conclusion: The decree was held enforceable against the appellant's property in execution.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed in its entirety because the appellant was bound by the compromise and undertaking recorded by the Special Court, the arrangement did not attract compulsory registration, and execution could proceed against the appellant's property in the event of default.
Ratio Decidendi: A consent order supported by an undertaking given to the court, though involving property of a non-party, is binding and enforceable where the undertaking was made to secure the compromise and does not itself create or transfer an interest in immovable property so as to require compulsory registration.