Refund limitation for returned goods runs from factory entry date; a permission letter is not a refund application.

Refund of duty on returned goods for remaking, refining or reconditioning is governed by the relevant-date rule in the Explanation to Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, so limitation runs from the date the returned goods enter the factory for that process. A letter merely seeking permission to clear goods beyond six months, while stating that a formal refund application will be filed later, is not itself a refund application. On the facts stated, the refund claim filed later than six months from entry into the factory was time-barred, and the earlier letter could not save limitation.

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Issues: Whether the refund claim was barred by limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act and whether the letter dated 20-8-96 could be treated as a refund application.

Analysis: The refund of duty on goods returned for being reprocessed and reconditioned was governed by the relevant-date rule in the Explanation to Section 11B, under which the date of entry of the returned goods into the factory for remaking, refining, reconditioning or similar process is the starting point for limitation. The letter dated 20-8-96 did not ask for refund of duty; it only sought permission to clear the goods beyond six months and stated that a formal refund application would be filed later. Since the actual refund claim was filed on 17-7-98, it was beyond six months from the date of entry of the goods into the factory.

Conclusion: The refund claim was time-barred and the letter dated 20-8-96 was not a refund application; the appeal failed.

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