Limitation for appeal ran from official communication of the order, and delay was not excused for want of sufficient cause.

Delay in filing the appeal was not condoned because limitation was held to run from communication of the order-in-appeal through official channels, not from later receipt of the original order. The plea that the appeal time began only upon receiving the original copy was rejected. An explanation based on consultant advice also failed, as no supporting material was produced to establish sufficient cause. The appeal was therefore barred by limitation.

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Issues: Whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned on the ground that limitation ran from the later receipt of the order-in-appeal, and whether sufficient cause was shown for the delay.

Analysis: The order-in-appeal was treated as communicated when a copy was received through official channels from the office of the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner. The plea that limitation commenced only on later receipt of the original order was rejected. The explanation based on advice of a consultant was also not accepted, as no supporting material was produced to establish sufficient cause.

Conclusion: The delay was not condoned and the appeal was held barred by limitation.

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