Winding-up court jurisdiction in arbitration matters: first application in a reference determines the proper forum

In company liquidation matters, the winding-up court may exercise concurrent jurisdiction under section 446 of the Companies Act, while section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act gives exclusive jurisdiction to the court where the first application in a reference is made. For the second, third, fourth and fifth references, the first application had already been filed before the winding-up court, making it the competent forum for those matters. No fresh leave under section 446(1) was required on the facts, and the application to set aside the award had to be returned for presentation before the proper court.

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Issues: (i) Whether the winding-up court had concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the application in view of the Arbitration Act and the Companies Act. (ii) Whether leave of the winding-up court was necessary for maintaining the application. (iii) Whether the application for setting aside the award had to be returned for presentation before the proper court.

Issue (i): Whether the winding-up court had concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the application in view of the Arbitration Act and the Companies Act.

Analysis: The jurisdiction under section 446(2) of the Companies Act was held to be concurrent and not exclusive. Section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act was construed as conferring exclusive jurisdiction only on the court where the first application in a particular reference had been made. Since the first application relating to the second, third, fourth and fifth references had been made before the winding-up court, that court became the competent court for those references. The Court further held that the winding-up court could exercise its special jurisdiction under sections 446(2) and 446(3) of the Companies Act in relation to those pending references.

Conclusion: The winding-up court had exclusive jurisdiction over the present application in respect of the second, third, fourth and fifth references.

Issue (ii): Whether leave of the winding-up court was necessary for maintaining the application.

Analysis: The Court treated the application as one arising out of the same arbitration proceedings and noted that the winding-up court had already entertained the matter in exercise of its jurisdiction. In the circumstances of the case, no fresh leave was required for the present application before the proper court.

Conclusion: No fresh leave under section 446(1) of the Companies Act was required.

Issue (iii): Whether the application for setting aside the award had to be returned for presentation before the proper court.

Analysis: As the winding-up court was held to be the proper forum for deciding the validity of the awards, the application could not proceed in the court where it had been filed. The matter therefore had to be presented before the court having jurisdiction under the governing statutory scheme.

Conclusion: The application was returned to the petitioner for filing before the proper court.

Final Conclusion: The dispute was not decided on the merits of the award itself, but on forum and jurisdiction, and the matter was directed to be pursued before the competent court.

Ratio Decidendi: Under section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act, the court where the first application in a reference is made acquires exclusive jurisdiction over that reference, and in company liquidation matters the winding-up court may also exercise concurrent jurisdiction under section 446 of the Companies Act.

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