Limitation barred prosecution for late company filings; default was not a continuing offence under the Companies Act.

Failure to hold the annual general meeting and to file the balance-sheet and profit and loss account within the statutory time was treated as an offence punishable with fine only, so the right to prosecute accrued when filing became due. Applying Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court held that cognizance was barred after expiry of the limitation period. The argument that the default was a continuing offence was rejected because the wording of Section 162(1) did not support that characterisation. The complaint was therefore time-barred and the prosecution could not proceed.

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Issues: Whether the complaint for contravention of filing obligations under the Companies Act was barred by limitation and whether the alleged default constituted a continuing offence.

Analysis: The complaint alleged failure to hold the annual general meeting and to file the balance-sheet and profit and loss account within the statutory time. The Court held that the offence was punishable with fine only and that the right to prosecute accrued on the date by which filing was required. Applying the bar under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court found that cognizance could not be taken after the expiry of the prescribed limitation period. The contention that the default was a continuing offence was rejected, as the language of Section 162(1) showed that the offence was not of that nature.

Conclusion: The complaint was barred by limitation and the prosecution could not proceed.

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