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Issues: (i) Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has statutory authority to levy the regulatory fee under Regulation 31A; (ii) Whether Regulation 31A is ultra vires the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 because regulatory fee cannot form part of insolvency resolution process costs; (iii) Whether the regulatory fee is a tax disguised as a fee for want of quid pro quo; (iv) Whether the regulatory fee is excessive, disproportionate and arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India; (v) Whether the proviso to Regulation 31A operates retrospectively; (vi) Whether Regulation 31A involves a colourable exercise of power or excessive delegation.
Issue (i): Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has statutory authority to levy the regulatory fee under Regulation 31A.
Analysis: Section 196(1)(c) authorises the Board to levy fees or other charges for carrying out the purposes of the Code; this authority is not confined to registration and renewal fees payable by insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies and information utilities. Sections 196 and 240 disclose the Board's broad executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative role across the corporate insolvency resolution process, including matters concerning the committee of creditors, voting, resolution plans and process costs.
Conclusion: Regulation 31A was made within the Board's statutory authority; the issue is against the petitioners.
Issue (ii): Whether Regulation 31A is ultra vires the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 because regulatory fee cannot form part of insolvency resolution process costs.
Analysis: Section 5(13)(e) is a residuary provision permitting costs specified by the Board, and Section 240(2)(d) expressly authorises regulations concerning such other costs. The distinct categories in Section 5(13)(a) to (d) do not constitute a common genus. Consequently, ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis cannot restrict Section 5(13)(e). Regulation 31(ba), read with Regulation 31A, validly includes the regulatory fee within insolvency resolution process costs.
Conclusion: Regulation 31A is not ultra vires the Code; the issue is against the petitioners.
Issue (iii): Whether the regulatory fee is a tax disguised as a fee for want of quid pro quo.
Analysis: For a regulatory fee, direct and arithmetically precise quid pro quo is unnecessary; a broad, general nexus between the levy and regulatory services is sufficient. The Board's regulation of insolvency service providers and its regulation-making, information, oversight and process-related functions provide an integrated regulatory framework benefiting corporate insolvency resolution process stakeholders, including resolution applicants. The levy supports the Board's regulatory functions and financial self-sufficiency.
Conclusion: The levy is a valid regulatory fee and not a tax; the issue is against the petitioners.
Issue (iv): Whether the regulatory fee is excessive, disproportionate and arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: A regulatory fee need not correspond exactly to annual expenditure or yield no surplus. The audited figures showed that the levy enabled the Board to meet its expenditure after earlier deficits, and did not establish an excessive, confiscatory or disproportionate collection. The amounts remain available for the Board's regulatory functions rather than forming part of the general revenues of the State.
Conclusion: The regulatory fee is neither excessive nor arbitrary and does not violate Article 14; the issue is against the petitioners.
Issue (v): Whether the proviso to Regulation 31A operates retrospectively.
Analysis: The proviso expressly applies to resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022 and is prospective in operation. Approval by the committee of creditors binds the committee and the resolution applicant as to commercial terms, but does not reduce the adjudicating authority to a ministerial role. The adjudicating authority must ensure compliance with Section 30(2), including priority payment of insolvency resolution process costs, and may require rectification or reconsideration in limited circumstances. No vested right was disturbed while approval remained pending.
Conclusion: The proviso is prospective and valid; the issue is against the petitioners.
Issue (vi): Whether Regulation 31A involves a colourable exercise of power or excessive delegation.
Analysis: The regulatory fee at 0.25 per cent of realisable value was not shown to be confiscatory or unreasonable. Sections 5(13)(e), 196(1)(c) and 240(2)(d) provide statutory guidance for the levy and its inclusion as a process cost. The challenged regulation is also subject to parliamentary laying under Section 241. The relevant enabling provisions and Regulation 31(ba) were not independently challenged.
Conclusion: Regulation 31A is neither a colourable exercise of power nor an instance of excessive delegation; the issue is against the petitioners.
Final Conclusion: Regulation 31A validly imposes regulatory fee as an insolvency resolution process cost for resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory regulator may levy a non-excessive regulatory fee under an express power to carry out the purposes of the governing code where the levy bears a broad nexus to its regulatory functions; direct quid pro quo with each payer is not indispensable.
Regulatory fees in insolvency may form process costs when expressly authorised and broadly connected to regulatory functions.
Regulation 31A validly imposes a regulatory fee as an insolvency resolution process cost for resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022. The Board's express power to levy fees for carrying out the Code's purposes, together with its regulation-making power over process costs, supports inclusion of the fee within the residuary category of insolvency resolution process costs. The levy remains a regulatory fee, rather than a tax, where it has a broad nexus with regulatory functions; direct payer-specific quid pro quo is unnecessary. The fee is not excessive, arbitrary, retrospective, colourable, or based on excessive delegation where statutory guidance and legislative oversight apply.
Regulatory fee under insolvency resolution process - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board's regulation-making power - Regulatory fee distinguished from tax - Prospective operation of regulatory fee Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board's regulatory role in CIRP - Power to levy regulatory fee - Board's authority to levy regulatory fee on resolution plans and its regulatory role in the corporate insolvency resolution process - HELD THAT: - The statutory scheme confers on the Board executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions extending throughout the corporate insolvency resolution process; its role is not confined to insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies and information utilities. The power to levy fees for carrying out the purposes of the Code cannot be restricted to registration and renewal fees for service providers, since such construction would render the wider statutory language otiose. Read conjointly, the provisions concerning other insolvency resolution process costs, levy of fees and regulation-making empowered the Board to prescribe the regulatory fee and include it in such costs. [Paras 28, 37, 40, 41] Regulation 31A was within the Board's statutory and quasi-legislative powers and was not imposed without authority of law. Residuary insolvency resolution process costs - Ejusdem generis - Inclusion of regulatory fee as an insolvency resolution process cost under the residuary provision - HELD THAT: - The enumerated categories of insolvency resolution process costs concern distinct kinds of expenses and do not constitute a common genus. The residuary expression permitting costs specified by the Board therefore cannot be cut down by ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis. The regulatory fee could consequently be included as an insolvency resolution process cost under the statutory and regulatory framework. [Paras 54, 55, 56, 58, 59] Regulation 31A is not ultra vires the Code. Regulatory fee and quid pro quo - Regulatory fee distinguished from tax - Character of the regulatory fee payable upon approval of a resolution plan as a fee rather than a tax - HELD THAT: - For a regulatory fee, direct and mathematically exact quid pro quo is unnecessary; a broad and general correlation between the levy and regulatory services is sufficient. The Board regulates material aspects of the corporate insolvency resolution process, including its stakeholders, voting, committee functioning, information memoranda, process costs and resolution plans. These wide-ranging services establish the requisite general nexus, and the levy cannot be treated as a tax masquerading as a fee. [Paras 84, 85, 86, 87, 88] The regulatory fee is a valid regulatory fee and not a tax. Excessiveness of regulatory fee - Financial independence of regulator - Whether the regulatory fee was excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary? - HELD THAT: - The audited accounts did not demonstrate collection so excessive or disproportionate as to alter the character of the levy. The fact that the Board generated a surplus after previously operating with a deficit did not establish excessiveness. Financial independence is integral to the Board's effective functioning as a regulator, and the levy served that objective without being shown to be confiscatory or unreasonable. [Paras 91, 93, 94, 95, 96] The levy was not excessive or disproportionate and did not infringe Article 14. Prospective operation of regulatory fee - Adjudicatory authority's role in resolution plan approval - Applicability of regulatory fee to resolution plans pending approval before the adjudicatory authority after the regulation came into force - HELD THAT: - A resolution plan approved by the committee of creditors is binding between the committee and the resolution applicant, but does not reduce the adjudicatory authority to a ministerial body. The adjudicatory authority must ensure compliance with statutory requirements, including priority payment of insolvency resolution process costs, and may in limited circumstances require reconsideration or rectification. The proviso operates from its stipulated effective date and does not disturb a vested right or impose liability retrospectively where the resolution plan was pending consideration when the regulation came into force. [Paras 106, 107, 108, 109, 110] The proviso to Regulation 31A is prospective and validly applies to the petitioners' pending resolution plans. Colourable exercise of power - Excessive delegation - Challenge to inclusion of regulatory fee in insolvency resolution process costs as a colourable exercise of power or excessive delegation - HELD THAT: - As the levy was neither excessive nor disproportionate and the governing statutory provisions and the regulation including the fee within insolvency resolution process costs were not challenged, no colourable exercise was established. The delegation was guided by the purpose of carrying out the Code and subject to parliamentary laying, and was neither unguided nor excessive. [Paras 111, 112, 113] The challenges based on colourable exercise of power and excessive delegation were rejected. Final Conclusion: The challenge to Regulation 31A of the IBBI Regulations was rejected. The regulatory fee was held to be statutorily authorised, validly included in insolvency resolution process costs, non-retrospective, and neither a tax nor an arbitrary or excessive levy; all petitions were dismissed.