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Issues: (i) Whether, in a scheme of compromise or arrangement, the High Court could substitute a new sponsor for the original sponsor while sanctioning the scheme; (ii) whether such substitution was impermissible as an indirect approval of a scheme earlier rejected by some classes of stakeholders; and (iii) whether the order compelled shareholders to sell their shares against their choice.
Issue (i): Whether, in a scheme of compromise or arrangement, the High Court could substitute a new sponsor for the original sponsor while sanctioning the scheme.
Analysis: Section 391 empowers the court to sanction a compromise or arrangement if the requisite majority approves it, while section 392 confers power to supervise implementation and to make such directions and modifications as are necessary for proper working of the scheme. That power is wide enough to include substitution of the original sponsor, because the sponsor is not part of the basic fabric of the compromise; the essential bargain is between the company and its members or creditors. Where the original sponsor has lost support and the substituted sponsor can make the scheme workable and more beneficial, the court may adopt that course in exercise of its supervisory and modifying jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The substitution of NDDB for TIL was legally permissible.
Issue (ii): Whether such substitution was impermissible as an indirect approval of a scheme earlier rejected by some classes of stakeholders.
Analysis: The objection failed because the sanctioned arrangement was not the rejected scheme in its original form. The court sanctioned an upgraded and modified arrangement that secured greater benefits for creditors, workers, and shareholders, and the later developments showed that the original sponsor could not effectively implement the scheme without the support of financial institutions. The court was entitled to consider subsequent events and to prefer the workable scheme that served the interests of all concerned and the public interest in reviving the unit.
Conclusion: The order did not amount to an unlawful indirect approval of a rejected scheme.
Issue (iii): Whether the order compelled shareholders to sell their shares against their choice.
Analysis: The shareholders had already agreed in principle to the transfer of their shares under the scheme; what changed was the price and the identity of the sponsor. The court held that the essence of the arrangement was monetary compensation, not the source of payment, and that the shareholders were being offered a substantially better consideration. In the circumstances, there was no legal compulsion or unfair deprivation of shareholder choice.
Conclusion: The order did not unlawfully compel shareholders to sell their shares.
Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge failed, and the modified scheme with substitution of NDDB was upheld as the more workable and beneficial arrangement for revival of the company.
Ratio Decidendi: In a compromise or arrangement under sections 391 and 392 of the Companies Act, 1956, the court may, at the stage of sanction and in order to secure proper working of the scheme, substitute the original sponsor with another sponsor if the substitution does not alter the basic bargain and makes the scheme workable and fair.