Issues: (i) Whether bail granted to a foreign national accused of an NDPS offence involving commercial quantity was sustainable under the statutory conditions governing bail; (ii) Whether uniform safeguards concerning bail, sureties and monitoring of foreign nationals accused in NDPS cases involving commercial quantity could be issued.

Issue (i): Whether bail granted to a foreign national accused of an NDPS offence involving commercial quantity was sustainable under the statutory conditions governing bail.

Analysis: Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 requires satisfaction of both conditions that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. The material concerning the alleged role, the commercial quantity involved, prior conviction in an NDPS case, and the possibility of enhanced punishment under Section 31A required heightened scrutiny. Prolonged custody and the protection of personal liberty under Article 21 do not dispense with the mandatory statutory framework. The bail order did not record the requisite satisfaction under Section 37 or address the likelihood of reoffending. The accused also absconded after release and the surety furnished was found to be fictitious.

Conclusion: The grant of bail was unsustainable and the bail stood cancelled, against the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether uniform safeguards concerning bail, sureties and monitoring of foreign nationals accused in NDPS cases involving commercial quantity could be issued.

Analysis: Fabricated sureties and the absence of a uniform verification mechanism created a systemic gap capable of frustrating criminal proceedings. Article 142 of the Constitution of India permits limited measures to secure complete justice where existing procedures prove inadequate, without supplanting substantive law. The safeguards were confined to foreign nationals accused in NDPS cases involving commercial quantity and were calibrated to preserve personal liberty, proportionality and judicial discretion where appropriate.

Conclusion: Binding safeguards were issued requiring, among other measures, deposit of passport, FRRO registration, ordinarily two verified sureties, re-verification of the accused's address and contact details before release, disclosure of financial sources and bank accounts, intimation to the concerned Embassy, creation of centralised databases and digital verification systems, departmental inquiry where verified sureties are subsequently found fake, creation of lien or charge over surety property, and insertion of Form 47A under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Final Conclusion: A uniform and targeted bail-security framework was established for foreign nationals accused of commercial-quantity NDPS offences, while retaining the constitutional requirement that restrictions on liberty remain lawful and proportionate.

Ratio Decidendi: In commercial-quantity NDPS cases, the statutory twin conditions for bail must be affirmatively satisfied and cannot be displaced solely by the duration of pre-trial custody; Article 21 operates harmoniously within that statutory framework.

Issues: (i) Whether an order refusing cognizance could be set aside in proceedings under Section 482 without hearing the person against whom allegations were made; (ii) Whether allegations arising from an unpaid money transaction and proposed sale of a flat warranted criminal cognizance.

Issue (i): Whether an order refusing cognizance could be set aside in proceedings under Section 482 without hearing the person against whom allegations were made.

Analysis: Setting aside the refusal of cognizance and remanding the matter would necessarily prejudice the person accused of the allegations. Dispensing with notice on the premise that such person had no right to be heard at the pre-cognizance stage was therefore inappropriate in the circumstances.

Conclusion: The order setting aside the refusal of cognizance without hearing the appellant was unsustainable, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether allegations arising from an unpaid money transaction and proposed sale of a flat warranted criminal cognizance.

Analysis: The transaction concerned recovery of money allegedly paid in instalments; the police enquiry and documentary material did not support the oral allegations, and prior orders had treated the dispute as civil. Criminal proceedings cannot be used to recover money or to coerce an accused to satisfy a monetary demand, particularly where the civil recovery remedy has become time-barred.

Conclusion: The allegations disclosed a civil dispute and did not warrant criminal cognizance, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The refusal of cognizance and dismissal of the complaint were restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Criminal process cannot be invoked as a coercive mechanism for recovery of money in a dispute that is essentially civil, and an order reopening refused cognizance cannot be made without hearing the affected accused where prejudice necessarily follows.

Issues: (i) Whether an unauthorised acceptance of resignation was validated retrospectively by subsequent ratification of the competent authority; (ii) Whether the acceptance of resignation and refusal to permit its withdrawal under the applicable statutory framework were valid.

Issue (i): Whether an unauthorised acceptance of resignation was validated retrospectively by subsequent ratification of the competent authority.

Analysis: The Board of Management was the competent authority to accept the resignation. Although the officer holding additional charge as Vice-Chancellor lacked valid delegated authority, the Board subsequently expressly ratified the acceptance. Ratification by the authority competent to perform the act validates an initially unauthorised but otherwise lawful act and operates retrospectively from the date of the original act. Further, the employee had sought waiver of notice, accepted the consequential documents and benefits, and acted upon the completed separation; he could not later challenge the transaction on a technical defect in its acceptance.

Conclusion: The Board's ratification retrospectively validated the acceptance of resignation, and the employee could not withdraw the resignation after it had taken effect. The issue is against the employee.

Issue (ii): Whether the acceptance of resignation and refusal to permit its withdrawal under the applicable statutory framework were valid.

Analysis: Under Statute 30, resignation took effect on its acceptance by the appointing authority, without communication of acceptance or expiry of the notice period being conditions of its legal effectiveness. The notice period regulated actual relieving only. The applicable Office Memorandum preserved the competent authority's discretion to refuse withdrawal before relieving, provided reasons were recorded and communicated. The reasoned refusal, founded on the employee's stated disinclination to continue and the stated purpose of joining another institution, was neither unlawful, mala fide nor perverse; judicial review could not substitute its assessment for that of the competent authority.

Conclusion: The resignation became effective upon acceptance, and the reasoned refusal to permit withdrawal was valid. Reinstatement and back wages were unavailable. The issue is against the employee.

Final Conclusion: The employee's separation from both institutions remained legally effective, and no entitlement to reinstatement or consequential back wages survived.

Ratio Decidendi: A competent authority's express ratification of an otherwise unauthorised but lawful acceptance of resignation relates back to validate it from inception; where a governing statute makes resignation effective on acceptance, withdrawal is subject to the competent authority's reasoned statutory discretion.

Issues: (i) Whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the dishonoured cheque and disproved the legally enforceable debt; (ii) Whether the High Court could, in revisional jurisdiction, reverse concurrent findings of conviction by reappreciating the evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the dishonoured cheque and disproved the legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: Admission of the signature on the cheque attracted the mandatory presumptions of consideration and discharge of debt or liability. The complainant established compliance with the requirements for dishonour of cheque, including timely presentation, demand notice and non-payment. The defence that a blank cheque had been furnished as security for a different loan lacked supporting contemporaneous evidence; the later notice demanding return of the cheque was treated as an afterthought. The complainant's evidence concerning the loan and financial assistance received from others remained credible after cross-examination. Financial incapacity was not established merely from the complainant's monthly income, particularly when evidence showed other investments and financial assistance. The accused had neither replied to the demand notice raising that defence nor adduced cogent material to displace the presumptions.

Conclusion: The accused failed to rebut the presumptions or disprove the legally enforceable debt; the conviction for dishonour of cheque was justified.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could, in revisional jurisdiction, reverse concurrent findings of conviction by reappreciating the evidence.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and is not equivalent to appellate jurisdiction. Concurrent factual findings may be disturbed only where they are perverse, grossly erroneous, based on irrelevant or no material, or result from non-consideration of relevant material or arbitrary exercise of discretion. The High Court substituted its own assessment of the evidence without identifying any such defect in the concurrent findings.

Conclusion: The High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in reversing the concurrent conviction.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent findings sustaining criminal liability for dishonour of cheque stand restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of a cheque is admitted, the statutory presumptions of consideration and discharge of liability operate unless displaced by cogent evidence; a revisional court cannot reappreciate evidence to overturn concurrent findings absent perversity or a jurisdictional defect.

Issues: Whether a company omitted as an accused in a complaint for dishonour of a cheque drawn on its account can subsequently be arraigned under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, so as to sustain prosecution of its authorised signatory under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Where a cheque is drawn on a company's bank account towards its liability, the company is the drawer and the primary offender under Section 138. Liability of directors or persons in charge of the company arises vicariously under Section 141, for which arraignment of the company is an imperative condition precedent. A complaint that omits the company consequently suffers from a fundamental defect and cannot validly found cognizance. Section 319 cannot be invoked to cure that defect by initiating prosecution against the company beyond the statutory limitation for a complaint under Section 142; a valid fresh complaint alone may be instituted within limitation, or after condonation upon sufficient cause.

Conclusion: The company could not be added under Section 319 to cure the defective complaint; the complaint against the authorised signatory and the consequential proceedings were legally unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India should be exercised to quash the subject FIRs; (ii) Whether FIRs registered by different complainants in relation to alleged cyber-fraud transactions should be clubbed and subjected to a composite investigation.

Issue (i): Whether the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India should be exercised to quash the subject FIRs.

Analysis: A petition under Article 32 for quashing criminal proceedings is maintainable where a fundamental-right violation or compelling circumstances warrant direct constitutional intervention. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction is extraordinary and ordinarily the aggrieved person must pursue remedies before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The assertions that the petitioner was abroad, lacked knowledge of the transactions, and that others misused the bank account did not establish infringement of a fundamental right or exceptional circumstances justifying bypass of those remedies.

Conclusion: Direct quashing relief under Article 32 was declined, against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether FIRs registered by different complainants in relation to alleged cyber-fraud transactions should be clubbed and subjected to a composite investigation.

Analysis: Multiple FIRs are impermissible only where they concern the same incident or connected acts forming one transaction; the determination turns on the test of sameness, including unity of purpose and design, proximity of time and place, and continuity of action. Here, the FIRs involved different complainants, occasions, victims, amounts, transactions and consequences, without a live transactional connection between them. A similar modus operandi and the alleged transfer of portions of the funds into one bank account did not make the incidents a single transaction. The investigations were at an early stage and required separate forensic examination, money-trail analysis and identification of participants.

Conclusion: Clubbing, consolidation and a composite investigation were refused, against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner may pursue remedies before the appropriate forum, with all parties' contentions remaining open for determination on their merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 32 jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings is ordinarily not exercised absent a demonstrated fundamental-right violation or exceptional circumstances, and separate FIRs may continue where distinct victims and transactions disclose distinct offences despite a similar modus operandi.

Issues: (i) Whether stamp duty on a Government mining lease is to be computed on dead rent or anticipated royalty; (ii) Whether the 1993 circular prescribing estimation of royalty for stamp-duty purposes is invalid.

Issue (i): Whether stamp duty on a Government mining lease is to be computed on dead rent or anticipated royalty.

Analysis: Section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 applies where the value of an instrument's subject matter cannot be ascertained at execution. Its mining-lease proviso specifically permits stamp duty to be assessed on royalty estimated as likely to be payable to the Government. Royalty varies with the quantity of mineral extracted, whereas dead rent is a fixed minimum payment determined by the leased area. Form K under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 expressly adopts anticipated royalty for stamp-duty purposes. Article 33(a) of Schedule 1-A did not displace this statutory lease stipulation.

Conclusion: Stamp duty is payable on anticipated royalty estimated in accordance with the mining-lease proviso, and not solely on dead rent. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the 1993 circular prescribing estimation of royalty for stamp-duty purposes is invalid.

Analysis: The circular requires the highest applicable basis among the production quantities stated in the application, the prescribed schedule quantity, and dead rent for estimating royalty. It does not make dead rent the exclusive measure. The estimation mechanism accords with Section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the statutory Form K lease terms.

Conclusion: The 1993 circular is not ultra vires. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme requires valuation of the mining lease for stamp-duty purposes by reference to estimated anticipated royalty, preserving the State's entitlement to duty on the lease's anticipated economic value.

Ratio Decidendi: For a Government mining lease whose value is indeterminate at execution, the specific proviso to Section 26 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 governs stamp-duty valuation through estimated anticipated royalty; dead rent is only a minimum payment and not the exclusive valuation basis.

Issues: (i) Whether a cash loan transaction allegedly violating Section 269SS affects the statutory presumptions and enforceability of liability under the cheque-dishonour provisions; (ii) Whether remand for fresh consideration was justified where execution of the cheques was admitted and the trial court had not properly assessed the evidence relevant to rebuttal of the presumptions.

Issue (i): Whether a cash loan transaction allegedly violating Section 269SS affects the statutory presumptions and enforceability of liability under the cheque-dishonour provisions.

Analysis: Admission of execution of a cheque raises the presumption of consideration and the presumption that the holder received it towards a legally enforceable debt or liability. A breach of Section 269SS attracts the stipulated penalty under Section 271D, but neither provision declares the underlying transaction illegal, invalid, or void. Such breach therefore does not, by itself, make the debt unenforceable or dislodge the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: A cash transaction exceeding the prescribed limit does not by itself render the debt unenforceable or rebut the presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act; the issue is against the accused-appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether remand for fresh consideration was justified where execution of the cheques was admitted and the trial court had not properly assessed the evidence relevant to rebuttal of the presumptions.

Analysis: The presumption in favour of the holder is rebuttable, but a bare denial is insufficient. The drawer must furnish an explanation, supported by cogent material, regarding the issuance of the cheque and its possession by the payee. Proof that the payee lacked financial capacity may assist rebuttal. The record indicated that evidence regarding the complainant's capacity to lend had been adduced but was not properly evaluated. As the challenged order was a remand order, appreciation of the evidence on merits was inappropriate.

Conclusion: The remand for a fresh decision after proper consideration of the evidence was justified; the issue is against the accused-appellant.

Final Conclusion: The trial court must expeditiously reconsider the complaint in accordance with the applicable presumptions and the evidentiary burden of rebuttal.

Ratio Decidendi: Violation of a fiscal restriction on cash loans, where it attracts only a statutory penalty and does not invalidate the transaction, cannot by itself defeat the presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability arising from an admitted cheque.

Issues: (i) Whether a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal before the 2016 amendment could constitute a "decree or order" for issuing an insolvency notice under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909. (ii) Whether Section 19(22A) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 retrospectively validated reliance on such a recovery certificate.

Issue (i): Whether a pre-2016 recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal could constitute a "decree or order" for issuing an insolvency notice under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909.

Analysis: Insolvency legislation, carrying grave civil consequences, must be strictly construed. The expression "decree or order" in Section 9(2) is to be understood in the context of the definitions under Sections 2(2) and 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and refers to a decree or order of a regularly constituted court. A recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the pre-amended recovery legislation is not equivalent to such a decree or order. The principle that an insolvency notice is not a mode of execution or enforcement further supports this interpretation.

Conclusion: A recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal before the 2016 amendment cannot constitute a "decree or order" under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 19(22A) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 retrospectively validated reliance on the recovery certificate.

Analysis: Section 19(22A), introduced in 2016, expressly deemed a recovery certificate to be a decree or order for specified insolvency proceedings. Its enactment indicates that the equivalence did not previously exist. The amendment was not given retrospective effect, and the rights and liabilities had to be determined according to the law applicable when the litigation commenced. A claim untenable at institution could not become tenable merely because of a subsequent statutory amendment. In any event, the amendment could not assist proceedings where the insolvency notice had already been quashed.

Conclusion: Section 19(22A) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 does not retrospectively validate the recovery certificate or aid the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The recovery certificate could not support initiation of insolvency proceedings under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, and the statutory amendment did not alter that result.

Ratio Decidendi: A recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal before the introduction of Section 19(22A) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 is not a "decree or order" capable of supporting an insolvency notice under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, and the later deeming provision has no retrospective operation.

Issues: Whether the Explanations to Rule 38 of the 2016 Rules and Rule 45(8)(a) of the 2017 Rules, which include royalty, District Mineral Foundation and National Mineral Exploration Trust payments in sale value for computing average sale price and royalty, are unconstitutional or ultra vires Section 9 of the MMDR Act.

Analysis: Subordinate legislation carries a presumption of constitutionality and may be invalidated only on recognised grounds such as violation of fundamental rights, inconsistency with the parent statute, lack of legislative competence or manifest arbitrariness. The measure of a levy is distinct from its nature, and the rule-making authority has broad latitude in prescribing the method of computation, provided that the measure bears a reasonable nexus to the levy. Inclusion of royalty, DMF and NMET payments in sale value operates as a regulatory measure to address manipulation and evasion in the computation of average sale price. The measure is neither capricious nor disproportionate, and comparison with coal is unjustified because coal is governed by a different pricing mechanism. The three-year restriction in Section 9(3) applies to revision of the royalty rate and does not prevent prescribing the method of computing the levy.

Conclusion: The impugned Explanations are constitutional and valid, do not violate Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, and are not ultra vires Section 9 of the MMDR Act.

Issues: (i) Whether a writ petition challenging inclusion of an advocate's name in the Indian Banks' Association Caution List is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution; (ii) Whether an advocate may be placed on the Caution List for alleged negligence in rendering a legal opinion; (iii) Whether allegations of an advocate's professional negligence or misconduct fall exclusively within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether a writ petition challenging inclusion of an advocate's name in the Indian Banks' Association Caution List is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Analysis: Article 226 extends beyond bodies qualifying as State under Article 12 where the challenged action has a public law element. The sector-wide Caution List is maintained pursuant to the banking regulatory framework and its circulation can materially impair an advocate's professional reputation, livelihood and freedom to practise. The function and effect of the action, rather than the formal status of the Indian Banks' Association, determine amenability to writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petition is maintainable under Article 226.

Issue (ii): Whether an advocate may be placed on the Caution List for alleged negligence in rendering a legal opinion.

Analysis: The Reserve Bank directions issued under Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 establish the Caution List as a fraud-prevention measure concerning third parties involved in fraudulent banking transactions. Fraud requires dishonest intent or deliberate facilitation of wrongdoing; an erroneous opinion or lapse in title verification, without fraud, collusion, criminality or deliberate wrongdoing, cannot be treated as fraud. A bank may discontinue an advocate's empanelment on grounds of dissatisfaction, but sector-wide circulation of adverse remarks on professional competence travels beyond the contractual relationship and impairs the advocate's freedom to practise.

Conclusion: Inclusion of an advocate's name in the Caution List solely for alleged negligence is impermissible and without jurisdiction.

Issue (iii): Whether allegations of an advocate's professional negligence or misconduct fall exclusively within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Advocates Act, 1961 provides a complete, structured disciplinary mechanism through the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India, including notice, hearing, evidence, sanctions and appellate remedies. The statutory scheme preserves the independence of the legal profession through peer-based self-regulation while requiring accountability. Banks and banking associations cannot create a parallel mechanism to adjudicate professional negligence or portray an advocate as professionally incompetent. Concerns regarding professional conduct must be placed before the competent Bar Council. To strengthen accountability, the Bar Council of India was directed to undertake a comprehensive performance audit of its disciplinary mechanisms and consider corrective measures.

Conclusion: Allegations of professional negligence or misconduct of an advocate fall within the exclusive disciplinary domain of the Bar Councils; banks and the Indian Banks' Association cannot determine or punish such alleged misconduct through a Caution List.

Final Conclusion: The adverse Caution List entry and remarks concerning the advocate's competence have no legal basis and must be removed; the Bar Council of India must pursue institutional reforms concerning disciplinary accountability and continuing legal education.

Ratio Decidendi: A private body exercising a sector-wide regulatory function that materially affects an individual's protected professional rights is amenable to writ review, and a fraud-prevention mechanism cannot be used to impose professional consequences on an advocate for alleged negligence outside the exclusive disciplinary framework under the Advocates Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether, for assessing the annual income of a deceased claimant under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the income-tax return of the previous year alone should be adopted or the average of the previous two or three years should be taken, and what distinction, if any, should be made between salaried and self-employed persons.

Analysis: The governing objective in compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award just and fair compensation. Income-tax returns are an important reference point, but there is no rigid formula for every case. For salaried persons, the previous year's return is ordinarily sufficient, subject to corroboration where a promotion or similar change has occurred. For self-employed persons and those carrying on business, income may fluctuate, and the average of up to the previous three years' income shown in the returns should ordinarily be used, along with surrounding factors such as the nature of business, growth pattern, potential growth, negative income in initial years, and the effect of death on the business.

Conclusion: The annual income of a self-employed deceased person is to be assessed, as a general rule, on the average of the income reflected in the previous up to three income-tax returns, while the previous year's return ordinarily suffices for salaried persons; the claimant-appellants succeeded on this issue.

Ratio Decidendi: In motor accident compensation, income-tax returns are relevant evidence of earnings, but self-employed income should ordinarily be assessed on the average of up to the previous three returns, whereas salaried income may ordinarily be assessed on the basis of the preceding year alone.

Issues: Whether the Delhi High Court was justified in declining to entertain the writ petition on the ground of forum non conveniens despite the respondents' offices being situated in Delhi and the Court having jurisdiction under Article 226.

Analysis: The writ petition could be maintained before more than one High Court on different jurisdictional bases. Where jurisdiction is attracted under Article 226 by reason of the situs of the respondents' office, the doctrine of forum non conveniens has a limited role and should be applied sparingly. In a challenge to dismissal from BSF service, the relevant records would ordinarily be available with the respondents, and the choice of a forum convenient to the respondents cannot be treated as self-defeating. The Delhi High Court, therefore, ought not to have declined to entertain the petition merely because other fora were also available.

Conclusion: The refusal to exercise jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens was unsustainable and the writ petition ought to be heard on merits.

Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in permitting the accused to travel abroad and in setting aside the order requiring deposit of his passport while criminal proceedings remained pending, and whether such restriction had to yield to the claim of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The criminal case had remained at the committal stage for years, and the accused had repeatedly approached the courts and obtained interim protections that impeded progress of the trial. The claim of medical need for travel abroad was weighed against the availability of comparable medical facilities in India, the pending criminal process, and the larger societal interest in effective administration of criminal justice. The right to travel abroad was treated as part of personal liberty, but it was held not to operate in isolation from the accused's obligation to face trial and the appellant's right to a speedy trial.

Conclusion: The High Court's order permitting travel abroad and interfering with the trial court's direction was unsustainable. The order requiring deposit of the passport was restored in effect, and the accused was left at liberty to seek permission from the Sessions Court after committal if travel abroad later became necessary.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that the permission to travel abroad granted by the High Court was set aside, while the accused was given only a future liberty to seek leave of the Sessions Court in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: The right to travel abroad under Article 21 is subject to a judicial balance with the accused's obligation to face trial and the prosecution's right to a speedy trial, and may be restricted where criminal proceedings and the interests of justice so require.

Issues: (i) Whether bail in a commercial quantity NDPS could be sustained without considering the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act; (ii) whether the respondent's period of custody warranted bail on the ground of prolonged incarceration under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether bail in a commercial quantity NDPS matter could be sustained without considering the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

Analysis: The offences arose from recovery of commercial quantity contraband, attracting the statutory bar under Section 37. The High Court's order did not record satisfaction on the twin requirements that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. In such cases, consideration of these conditions is mandatory and cannot be bypassed by a liberal approach to bail.

Conclusion: The bail order could not be sustained and was rightly interfered with, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the respondent's period of custody warranted bail on the ground of prolonged incarceration under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The respondent had undergone about 1 year and 7 months of custody in a case carrying a maximum sentence of twenty years, and the Court held that this period did not constitute such prolonged incarceration as to override the statutory restrictions applicable to the case. The existence of similar antecedents further weighed against satisfaction of the requirement that he was not likely to commit an offence while on bail.

Conclusion: No bail was warranted on the ground of prolonged incarceration, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the grant of regular bail was set aside, and the respondent was denied bail under the governing NDPS bail standard.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases involving commercial quantity under the NDPS Act, courts must strictly apply Section 37 and record satisfaction of the twin conditions before granting bail, and custody of a relatively short duration does not by itself justify release where those conditions are not met.

Issues: (i) whether Sheikh Mehmood and Ravinder Kumar Gupta were entitled to bail pending trial in a case involving allegations of conspiracy and participation in a homicidal assault; (ii) whether Parshotam Singh, Suraj Singh, Vikas Singh and Sandeep Charak were entitled to bail on the material then available.

Issue (i): whether Sheikh Mehmood and Ravinder Kumar Gupta were entitled to bail pending trial in a case involving allegations of conspiracy and participation in a homicidal assault.

Analysis: Bail was assessed on the settled balance between the rule of liberty and the seriousness of the accusation, with emphasis on the prima facie material, the gravity of the offence, the nature of the evidence, antecedents, age and health, and the risk of influencing witnesses or derailing the trial. As regards Sheikh Mehmood and Ravinder Kumar Gupta, the Court noted their advanced age, medical condition in the case of Sheikh Mehmood, and inconsistencies in the evidence to some extent against Ravinder Kumar Gupta.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to Sheikh Mehmood and Ravinder Kumar Gupta, subject to conditions to be imposed by the trial court, and the result was in their favour.

Issue (ii): whether Parshotam Singh, Suraj Singh, Vikas Singh and Sandeep Charak were entitled to bail on the material then available.

Analysis: The Court found that, on the material then available, the case against these appellants could not be treated as one lacking an overt homicidal act, a link between the death and the alleged conspiracy, or shared intention. The seriousness of the offence and the prima facie material were considered sufficient to refuse bail at that stage.

Conclusion: Bail was declined to Parshotam Singh, Suraj Singh, Vikas Singh and Sandeep Charak at that stage, and the result was against them.

Final Conclusion: The batch of appeals was disposed of by enlarging two appellants on bail and declining bail to the remaining appellants, with liberty to seek renewal of bail after further progress of the trial.

Ratio Decidendi: In serious offences involving homicide and conspiracy, bail turns on a cumulative assessment of the prima facie case, gravity of the offence, nature of evidence, antecedents, age, health, and the risk of witness interference, and may be granted selectively where these considerations justify differential treatment among accused persons.

Issues: (i) Whether the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and its 2017 amendment operate retrospectively so as to require in-service teachers appointed earlier to qualify the Teacher Eligibility Test; (ii) whether the first proviso to section 12A of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 protects such teachers from the TET requirement; (iii) whether insisting on TET amounts to an impermissible change in service conditions; and (iv) whether the time earlier granted for acquiring TET required extension.

Issue (i): Whether the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and its 2017 amendment operate retrospectively so as to require in-service teachers appointed earlier to qualify the Teacher Eligibility Test.

Analysis: Section 23 of the RTE Act distinguishes between future appointments and teachers already in service. The words used in the provision show that the minimum qualification is prospective for new appointments, while the provisos expressly preserve the position of existing teachers by granting time to obtain the qualification. The 2017 amendment further extended the compliance window for teachers already appointed or continuing in service. The statutory scheme therefore recognizes existing appointments while still requiring eventual compliance with minimum standards.

Conclusion: The RTE Act and the 2017 amendment are not retrospectively invalidating, and in-service teachers remain bound to acquire TET within the statutory period.

Issue (ii): Whether the first proviso to section 12A of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 protects such teachers from the TET requirement.

Analysis: The first proviso preserves continuance of persons recruited before the commencement of the NCTE Amendment Act, 2011, but the second proviso makes the minimum qualifications applicable within the period specified under the RTE Act. The two provisos must be read together, and the protection against adverse effect does not eliminate the statutory obligation to acquire the prescribed qualifications within time.

Conclusion: The NCTE Act does not exempt in-service teachers from acquiring TET within the time fixed by the RTE regime.

Issue (iii): Whether insisting on TET amounts to an impermissible change in service conditions.

Analysis: The requirement is not a newly imposed adverse service condition but a statutory qualification designed to secure educational standards for children. The provision allows time for compliance and does not immediately terminate existing service. The challenge based on change in conditions of service therefore does not succeed.

Conclusion: Requiring TET is not an unlawful change in service conditions.

Issue (iv): Whether the time earlier granted for acquiring TET required extension.

Analysis: While the challenge to the underlying legal position failed, the Court took note of the practical impact on teachers and continuity of elementary education. Exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court extended the earlier period for obtaining TET from two years to three years and directed periodic conduct of the examination, preferably twice a year.

Conclusion: The time for acquiring TET was extended to 31 August 2028.

Final Conclusion: The review petitions failed on the merits of the challenge to the TET mandate, but limited equitable relief was granted by enlarging the compliance period for in-service teachers.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory requirement designed to maintain educational standards may validly apply to in-service teachers through a prospective compliance window, and a review will not lie absent error apparent on the face of the record, though equitable time relief may be granted under Article 142 where necessary.

Outcome: The matter was disposed of after settlement between the parties, the impugned order was set aside, and the review petitions stood disposed of.

Issues: Whether criminal prosecution for cheating and use of forged documents could be continued after the loan account was settled through an approved compromise recorded by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

Analysis: The dispute arose out of a banking transaction that culminated in a negotiated compromise approved by the bank's competent authority, followed by payment of the settlement amount, issuance of a no dues certificate, and withdrawal of the recovery proceedings by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The governing principles on quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permit interference where the dispute is overwhelmingly civil in nature, the possibility of conviction is remote, and continuation of prosecution would amount to abuse of process. The Court distinguished cases involving special-statute offences and held that a belated criminal prosecution initiated after full settlement, despite the bank having earlier accepted the compromise and recorded that no documentation lapse was found, was oppressive and inconsistent with the settlement's judicial imprimatur.

Conclusion: Criminal prosecution was not permitted to continue and the quashing relief was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the High Court order was set aside, and the chargesheet as well as the charge-framing order were quashed because the criminal case could not be sustained after a duly approved and implemented compromise of the banking dispute.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a commercial banking dispute has been fully and finally settled through a compromise endorsed by the competent authority and recorded by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, belated criminal proceedings arising from the same transaction may be quashed if their continuance would be an abuse of process and the prospect of conviction is remote and bleak.