TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1989 (4) TMI 336
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.... said (Vasista-Sanhita, Chapter II, Verses 36042) that "if destruction of foetus and exaction of interest were weighed in balance, the destroyer of foetus would go upon the scale and Usurer would fall down", and commenting on this, Dr. P. N. Sen in his Tagore Law Lecturers on Hindu Jurisprudence (1918, page 300) said that this figuratively expresses the Sage's opinion that extortion of interest which sucks the life-blood, so to say, of living men is even more reprehensible than the destruction of foetus which has not yet seen light of the day". But notwithstanding such strong denouncement, Vasista could not declare it to be illegal but. branded the Usurer as a "sinner who is lost to. all virtuous acts". Narada also prohibited such practice for the Brahmins and Khatriyas, but conceded it for the Vaisyas, the commercial while characterising such acquisition as "partly black (impure)". "The world", said Swami Vivekananda, "is in the third epoch under the domination of the Vaishyas (the merchant, the third estate)" and would continue to be so until the advent of "the fourth epoch" which "will be under the domination of the Shudras (the proletariat)". 4. The classical Islamic Law....
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.... Bihar Money-Lenders Act, whereunder reliefs were awardable to the debtors, the Federal Court ruled that because of the word 'may', the Court had the discretion to_award or not to award all or any of the reliefs, we do not find any reasons as to why the same conclusion would not follow in respect of S. 34 or O. 34, R. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereunder it is provided that the Court 'may' award interest, and why, according to the ratio of the Federal Court decision in Jaigobind Singh (supra), this should not mean that the Court may not award interest at all. 7. It is true that there are a number of Division Bench decisions of this Court in Nilmoni Sardar v. Baidyanath Das, , in West Bengal Financial Corpn. v. Bertram Scott, , in United Bank of India v. New Glencoe Tea Co., , in State Bank of India v. B. Gupta, and in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Kumar Purnendu Nath, , holding that the expression "may" in S. 34 as well as O. 34, R. 11 of the Civil P.C. does not vest the Court with any discretion at all to grant or not to grant interest and the grant of interest, notwithstanding the expression "may", is a must, while only the rate or the amount ....
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....d bind us. And that would be good enough for our present purpose. 10. We have recently pointed out in State Bank of India v. Amal Kumar Sen, (1988) 1 Cal LJ 83 : (1988 Lab IC 1585) and then also in Sudhangshu Mohan Chakraborty v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1988) 92 Cal WN 1092, that a forensic combat between the Creditor and the Debtor under the adversary system of trial prevailing in our Courts is very often an unequal combat, notwithstanding all our constitutional pledge to secure Social Justice and our constitutional mandate to ensure Equality. We have pointed out further that Judiciary is also "State" within the meaning of Art. 12 and Art. 36 of the Consti-tution and has all the obligation to promote-"Equal Justice" (Art. 39A) and to "strive to minimise inequalities in income and to endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status facilities and opportunities" and to protect "as effectively as it may a Social Order in which Justice, Social and Economic, shall inform all the institutions of the national life" (Art. 38). And since in the present Indian context, Socio-Economic Justice would obviously mean justice to the weaker and the poorer, we must evolve a new jurist....
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.... in Pomal v. Vrajlal, , a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through Sabya-sachi Mukharji, J., (at p. 444) has, in a mortgage suit, held that "the law must transform itself to the social awareness" about the poor and "poverty should not be unduly permitted to curtail one's right to borrow money on the ground of justice, equity and good conscience on just terms" and it must see that there "is no taking advantage of the oppressed or depressed people." 13. Be that as it may, here in this case, the trial Court, while decreeing the suits of the creditor, has not awarded any pendente lite or post-decree interest. It had the discretion to award or not to award and has exercised the same in favour of the debtor. The generally accepted principle is, as pointed out by the Privy Council in Rehamatunnissa Begum v. Prince AIR 1917 PC 116 at P. 118 that "it is opposed to sound practice for an appellate Court to substitute its discretion.for that of the Court from which an appeal has been preferred". The Federal Court in Jaigobind Singh (supra also relied on this decision and observed that "if there can be no legal objection to the way in which discretion has or has not been ex....