1950 (3) TMI 27

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....(1) of Section 30 of the Act, is one under Section 31 and as such appealable under Section 33(1) of the Act; and (2) Whether such an order passed before expiry of the time either as originally fixed or later extended by competent authority for payment of the tax is good in law." Of the two questions, the second one strictly falls within the scope of the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal in the event of our answer to question No. (1) being in the affirmative. When the appeal goes back to the Appellate Tribunal it will be for them to consider whether the order of extension, if any, granted by the Income-tax authorities was a valid order and would conduce to the assessee being considered for the purpose of the proviso to Sect....

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....h an appeal does lie, or, in other words, whether the appeal is competent, that is to say, whether the assessee-appellant has fulfilled the conditions which are pre-requisite for an appeal. Within the provisions of Section 31, there is nothing to empower an appellate authority to pass any order by way of admitting an appeal. Admission of an appeal has not been sufficiently provided for within the purview of the Income-tax Act, but it is not strange to the scheme of the Act. By contrast, I refer to the admission of an appeal as provided for in the concluding portion of subsection (2) of Section 30. That sub-section provides, in the main, a time limit for appeals of various classes, the starting points of such time-limits varying according to....

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....ound may be one of a preliminary character but when decided one way or the other, and particularly when it is decided against the assessee, it goes to the root of the matter and amounts to a final disposal of the appeal. In the order calling upon the Tribunal to state a case, we made a reference to a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in which a similar question, though not the same, was debated and it was decided in the same way in which we propose to answer the question before us. As against that, Mr. Das, learned Standing Counsel, invited our attention to the Bombay case already referred to. The ratio of the Bombay decision is that the order in question was one within sub-section (2) of Section 30 to which I have referred. Su....